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ABSTRACT

The British media discourse evolved during the first two years of World War II, as state
narratives and censorship began taking a more prominent role. I trace this shift through an
examination of newspapers from three British regions during this period, including London, the
Southwest, and the North. My research demonstrates that at the start of the war, the press
featured early unity in support of the British war effort, with some regional variation. As the war
progressed, old political and geographical divergences came to the forefront in coverage of
events such as Prime Minister Chamberlain’s resignation. The government became increasingly
concerned about the grim portrayals of the Dunkirk Evacuation in the press, as Britain’s wartime
situation deteriorated. I argue that as censorship and propaganda increased, newspapers fell into
line, adhering to state narratives and uniting behind a circumscribed version of the events that
molded a heroic presentation of Dunkirk. Censorship from the government came in various
forms, often utilizing softer methods such as the control of information flow and warning
publications, which complied in order to appear patriotic and avoid further suppression. My
analysis of these papers indicates that this censorship and unity of the press continued during
coverage of the Blitz, as the media discourse became more cohesive and supportive of the
government’s goals.
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INTRODUCTION
For British civilians, the First World War “had come all at once, in a frightening rush” in
1914.1 In sharp contrast, a British woman recalled that World War II arrived in a much more
ominous manner, as if accompanied by the “slow ticking of a clock” during the summer months
of 1939.2 Initially, many British politicians and members of the general public expressed a desire
to avoid another European conflict, wishing to avert the deaths of another generation of young
British soldiers. Nevertheless, Britain and France eventually declared war on Germany once
again in response to the German invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939.3 The earliest phase of
the war, referred to as the “Phoney War” or “Bore War,” contained very little direct conflict
between British and German forces.4 This inactivity ended with the German invasion of France
and the Low Countries, and Britain subsequently evacuated the British Expeditionary Force
(B.E.F.) from the French port of Dunkirk during Summer 1940.5 After the Dunkirk Evacuation,
the British Home Front faced its most difficult test during “the Blitz,” as German bombers
targeted British civilian centers from Autumn 1940 until Summer 1941.6
British newspapers covered all of these events during the first two years of the war,
displaying a significant amount of unity even during the earliest phase of the conflict before
1

John Kelly, Never Surrender: Winston Churchill and Britain's Decision to Fight Nazi Germany in the Fateful
Summer of 1940 (New York: Scribner, 2015), 29.
2
Kelly, Never Surrender, 29.
3
Kelly, Never Surrender, 4-7, 20-30; A.J.P. Taylor, English History, 1914-1945 (1965; Reprint, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2001), 442-453; Angus Calder, The People's War: Britain, 1939-45 (New York: Random
House, 1969), 32-34.
4
Taylor, English History, 454; Calder, The People's War, 57-63; Sian Nicholas, The Echo of War: Home Front
Propaganda and the Wartime BBC, 1939-45 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), 41.
5
Taylor, English History, 485-487.
6
Taylor, English History, 501-504.

1

government censorship increased. Utilizing discourse analysis, my research examines several
British newspapers from three specific regions in order to analyze the evolution of British media
discourse during the early wartime era. The British press began the war with a mostly supportive
and unified stance regarding the government and the war effort, but old regional and political
biases resurfaced as the nation experienced turbulent events such as Chamberlain’s political fall.
During the Dunkirk Evacuation, journalists described the grim outlook of the British military
position and the government grew concerned about subsequent loss of morale on the Home
Front. Consequently, the Ministry of Information began to implement more extensive
propaganda and censorship, and papers transitioned into a more state narrative-driven support of
the war, which continued during the Blitz. 7
Newspapers offer a unique perspective on how the media presented these wartime events
to the public, as well as the influence of the government on this presentation. Papers also provide
a window into the anxieties of British citizens on the Home Front, as certain topics and events
aimed to reassure or address these concerns. I argue that the British media discourse at the start
of World War II, rather than being divided and fractured, exemplified a largely unified stance on
the war effort and early events in the conflict. As regional and political divergences grew, the
government ramped up control of the press during the Dunkirk Evacuation, and papers
responded by utilizing state narratives and returning to this unified discourse on wartime events.
My research focuses on papers from London, the Southwest, and the North, which provides a
comprehensive cross-section of both regional and political attitudes in British newspaper

7

David Welch, Persuading the People: British Propaganda in World War II (London: The British Library, 2016),
12-17; Philip M. Taylor, British Propaganda in the Twentieth Century: Selling Democracy (Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press, 1999), 160-164. See also Aaron L. Goldman, “Press Freedom in Britain During
World War II,” Journalism History 22 (Winter 1997): 146-155; K. Fred Gillum, “Censorship During World War
II,” Salem Press Encyclopedia (Ipswich: Salem Press, 2015). Full text of both articles is available on the EBSCO
Discovery Service Database, without page numbers.
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publication. In the Southwest of England, I have examined papers from Bristol and Gloucester,
while I have utilized publications from Manchester and Liverpool in Northern England. I have
also focused on several newspapers from London, the capital city and the center of the British
government and war effort.8
This research primarily concentrates on the British Home Front, as newspapers during the
war directed their efforts toward Home Front readership. There is an extensive historiography of
scholarly works focusing on the British Home Front during World War II. These works are
divided into two distinct waves of scholarship, progressing from early histories which
emphasized the unity of the Home Front, into more recent studies which viewed the Home Front
in a much more critical manner.9
The first wave of Home Front scholarship began immediately after the war's conclusion
in 1945 and continued until the late 1970s. This wave included many wartime British historians
who experienced the events of World War II firsthand, regarding them in a positive, almost
mythological view. These scholars viewed Dunkirk, the Blitz, and other turbulent events of the
war as a “coming of age for Britain,” when the mutual suffering of the British people brought
greater unity and social cohesion.10 Richard Titmuss's Problems of Social Policy: History of the
Second World War was one of the first comprehensive British histories of the conflict and its
effect on the Home Front.11 Published in 1950, Titmuss's monograph is representative of this first
wave, emphasizing the unity and perseverance of British society during the war, and
downplaying any negative aspects of the Home Front. A.J.P. Taylor continued this trend in 1965
8

Welch, Persuading the People, 12-17; Taylor, British Propaganda in the Twentieth Century, 160-164; Goldman,
“Press Freedom in Britain During World War II”; Gillum, “Censorship During World War II.”
9
Jose Harris, “War and Social History: Britain and the Home Front during the Second World War,” Contemporary
European History 1, no. 1 (Mar. 1992), 17-20.
10
Craig Stewart-Hunter, “ 'Britain Can Take It': Rethinking British Morale in 1940,” Student Pulse 3, no. 3 (2011),
accessed April 4, 2016. <http://www.studentpulse.com/articles/406/britain-can-take-it-rethinking-british-moralein-1940>.
11
Richard Titmuss, Problems of Social Policy: History of the Second World War (London: HMSO, 1950).
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with his study, English History, 1914-1945.12 Taylor focused on the heroism of the British people
during such difficult times as the Blitz, arguing that these harrowing experiences actually
increased British morale and united individuals across all social classes.13 Throughout the 1960s
and early 1970s, several other scholarly histories of the Home Front continued to develop these
positive and inspirational themes.14
Beginning in the late 1970s, this reverent attitude toward the British wartime experience
began to change. Tom Harrisson published one of the first major revisionist studies of the Home
Front in 1976, Living Through the Blitz, in which he examined the fearful reactions of ordinary
people and the numerous shortcomings of the British government during the heavy German
bombing of the nation.15 This study marked the beginning of the second wave of Home Front
scholarship, which continued from the late 1970s into the present. Mostly born after World War
II, these scholars put forth more critical views of the Home Front during the wartime years. In
addition, second wave historians utilized increased access to government reports and archives,
which provided additional perspectives on the Home Front.16
Angus Calder provided a concise articulation of the second wave's revisionist arguments
in his 1991 study, The Myth of the Blitz.17 Calder argued that the popular narrative of first wave
histories glossed over many British problems of the wartime years, including civil unrest and
objections to the war.18 Several other scholarly histories of the Home Front continued these

12

Taylor, English History.
Taylor, English History, 501-504.
14
See Angus Calder, The People's War: Britain, 1939-45 (New York: Random House, 1969); Henry Pelling, Britain
and the Second World War (1970; 2nd ed., London: Collins, 1972); Norman Longmate, How We Lived Then: A
History of Everyday Life during the Second World War (1971; Reprint, London: Random House UK, 2002).
15
Tom Harrisson, Living Through the Blitz (1976; Reprint, London: Faber and Faber, 2011).
16
Stewart-Hunter, “ 'Britain Can Take It': Rethinking British Morale in 1940”; Harris, “War and Social History,” 1720.
17
Angus Calder, The Myth of the Blitz (1991; 2nd ed., London: Pimlico, 1992).
18
Calder, The Myth of the Blitz, 1-5, 92, 103, 107-110.
13
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revisionist arguments during the 1990s and into the twenty-first century.19 More recently, Susan
Grayzel examined the connection between German bombing raids on Britain during the First and
Second World Wars in her 2012 monograph, At Home and Under Fire.20 Several studies in the
second wave also focused on British propaganda and censorship targeted at the Home Front.21
My research contributes to this second wave of Home Front scholarship by focusing
particularly on newspapers from five cities within three distinct English regions, including
London, the Southwest, and the North. Examining publications from these three regions allows
for a more insightful comparison between different regional media during the war. Many
histories from the first wave described the British Home Front as mostly supportive of the
declaration of war, while acknowledging that this unity increased after the Dunkirk Evacuation.22
In contrast, second wave studies of the Home Front emphasized many of the problems faced by
the British people at home, particularly early in the war. These more recent studies noted that
British society during the war featured class conflicts, a lack of popular support for the war, and
fears of German bombing and invasion.23
While my research builds upon these second wave histories, it also adds a new element to
19

See Clive Ponting, 1940: Myth and Reality (London: Ivan R. Dee, 1993); Sonya O. Rose, Which People's War?:
National Identity and Citizenship in Britain, 1939-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Peter Stansky,
The First Day of the Blitz (London: Yale University Press, 2007).
20
Susan R. Grayzel, At Home and Under Fire: Air Raids and Culture in Britain from the Great War to the Blitz (
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
21
See Welch, Persuading the People; Nicholas, The Echo of War; Taylor, British Propaganda in the Twentieth
Century; Edward Stourton, Auntie's War: The BBC During the Second World War (London: Doubleday, 2017);
James Chapman, The British at War: Cinema, State and Propaganda, 1939-1945 (London: I.B. Tauris, 1998).
22
For example, A.J.P. Taylor asserted in his first wave history that the evacuation of children from the major cities
increased class awareness and support for the government's wartime policies. Taylor also asserted that the
declaration of war in 1939 was supported throughout the country, that rationing was generally popular among the
British populace, and the Home Front “remained unruffled” even when the B.E.F. faced annihilation in the days
leading up to the Dunkirk Evacuation. Other first wave histories contained similarly optimistic portrayals of
Home Front unity during the early period of the war. Taylor, English History, 455-457, 463-464, 488.
23
For example, Sonya O. Rose emphasized the strong class resentment even early in the war, which was exacerbated
by food rationing as well as the domestic evacuation of children from the cities, which underscored the dire
poverty faced by many British people and the lack of concern displayed by upper classes for the rest of society.
Rose, Which People's War?, 34-35, 57. Calder also acknowledged this lack of unity and the presence of class
problems while discussing the pervasive issues faced by the British Home Front. Calder, The Myth of the Blitz,
120-139.
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these histories by emphasizing the large degree of unity on the Home Front, even early in the
war. But this unity was found within British newspaper reports, not among the people
themselves. According to my research, British papers from 1939-1941 displayed many
commonalities, as newspapers from disparate regions and political leanings utilized the same
language and themes to discuss certain topics, and expressed many similar views on these events
as well.24 However, as the war progressed, regional and political divergences also came to the
forefront, including a focus on different aspects of the war and differing portrayals of politicallyinfused issues, before unity returned to the press after the Dunkirk Evacuation.
Any examination of British newspapers during the war must acknowledge the significant
influence of propaganda and censorship on wartime publications. The British government
engaged in varying levels of press censorship during World War II. At the start of the war in
1939, the government established a new Ministry of Information, with an emphasis on
encouraging British morale on the Home Front.25 A former Deputy General of the BBC, Sir John
Reith, became the first Minister of Information and directed the Ministry in enacting these goals.
Reith’s Ministry of Information initially instituted a system of “voluntary censorship,” under
which journalists followed a set of rather vague guidelines and essentially censored themselves.
Under this system, journalists had to receive all sensitive information regarding the war from
government channels, as the Ministry restricted the flow of information to the media. Journalists
then wrote their articles, and a specific editor at each paper passed on any articles which they felt
violated the censorship guidelines. Newspaper stories which made it through this system could
go to print, unless the British military disagreed with the ruling and got involved. Articles in
violation of the censorship guidelines received a defense advisory notice. This voluntary
24

This was at least partly due to British propaganda, censorship, and state narratives of the war, which I will further
detail in the rest of this introduction.
25
Welch, Persuading the People, 14-15.
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censorship system proved to be problematic, as journalists became contemptuous of the press
censors, and the government censors themselves became too concerned with specific details and
failed to implement an overarching strategy for guiding press articles about the war. Prime
Minister Neville Chamberlain attempted to address the situation by creating a new Press and
Censorship Bureau which was separate from the Ministry of Information, but this only caused
further inter-departmental strife as well as other problems.26
As Winston Churchill replaced Chamberlain in April 1940 and formed a new
government, he replaced Reith with Duff Cooper. The Press and Censorship Bureau also
dissolved, with the Ministry of Information again assuming all duties for censorship and
propaganda on the Home Front. This new Minister of Information focused more on gathering
data from the Home Front in order to see what strategies improved the people’s morale. Cooper
also recognized that news censorship should be integrated with propaganda distribution. Once
the Ministry switched to this strategy, its control of British press became more successful,
controlling the narrative of wartime news reports on the Home Front.27
The Ministry's censorship was so effective that many in the general public did not even
realize the system was in place, and Britain gained a reputation for its “honest, free, and truthful
media” during the wartime years. State propaganda largely focused on justification of the war,
anti-German sentiment, keeping the population healthy, rationing, generally increasing public
morale, and encouraging the British people to contribute and support the conflict, and these state
narratives began to appear in newspapers as well. As Britain's situation in the war worsened,
Henry Irving and Judith Townend, “Censorship and National Security: Information Control in the Second World
War and Present Day,” History & Policy, February 10, 2016, accessed November 2, 2019,
<http://www.historyandpolicy.org/policy-papers/papers/censorship-and-national-security-information-control>;
Welch, Persuading the People, 14-15; Taylor, British Propaganda in the Twentieth Century, 159-161; Gillum,
“Censorship During World War II.”
27
Welch, Persuading the People, 14-15; Taylor, British Propaganda in the Twentieth Century, 160-161; Goldman,
“Press Freedom in Britain During World War II.”
26
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Cooper’s Ministry of Information increased its focus on Home Front morale, extending the use
of both censorship and propaganda.28
As the Dunkirk Evacuation progressed in May-June 1940, Cooper’s Ministry of
Information became concerned that the near-destruction of Britain’s army on the Continent could
lead to negative morale on the Home Front. Churchill's government enacted “broad regulations
on the press” in order to give the Ministry of Information, and the government as a whole,
greater control over journalistic coverage of the war effort. Defense Regulations 2C and 2D
enabled the British government to suppress any press material which could encourage resistance
to the war effort. At Minister Cooper’s urging, the government also replaced the previous
advisory notices for journalistic content violating the censorship rules. Instead of these advisory
notices, the Ministry began implementing “legally-binding orders issued by a Censorship Board”
in June 1940, giving the Ministry’s censorship powers more weight and leading to widespread
opposition among British journalists.29
The government mostly utilized its increased control of the media to suppress Fascist and
Communist-leaning publications such as the Daily Worker and The Week, which I am not
focusing on in this research, but the threat of censorship and suppression remained present for all
newspapers. The Ministry of Information repeatedly warned several newspapers for printing
negative material about the British government and military, including the Daily Mirror, the
Sunday Pictorial, and The Times. During the Blitz, the Ministry further increased its propaganda
efforts, fearing that public morale could fall to dangerously low levels. Throughout these first
several years of the war, the British government crafted a narrative for the general public through

28

Welch, Persuading the People, 14-15, 17, 22-41, 43, 48; Taylor, British Propaganda in the Twentieth Century,
160-161; Goldman, “Press Freedom in Britain During World War II.”
29
Goldman, “Press Freedom in Britain During World War II”; Irving and Townend, “Censorship and National
Security.”
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both forceful and voluntary measures, censoring material and distributing propaganda while also
encouraging the press to cooperate and support the war effort. This state narrative emphasized
the unity of the British Home Front in support of the war, while minimizing potentially divisive
issues such as class conflict.30
In addition to the propaganda and censorship, some further context is needed regarding
the British political system and the particular newspapers from my research. At the start of the
war in 1939, Prime Minister Chamberlain and the right-wing Conservative Party held power in
the British government. Despite Chamberlain's failed attempts to appease Hitler in the months
prior to the war, the Conservative Party did not lose much support after the declaration of war in
September 1939. Conservatives held the majority in Parliament, with the left-wing Labour Party
as the next-largest political party. Labour “accepted an electoral truce” upon the commencement
of the war, but refused to join the government as long as Chamberlain was its leader.31 The rightleaning Liberals remained the third-largest party, favored by some business interests in Britain
but lacking the widespread support of Conservatives and Labour.32 Chamberlain eventually fell
from political favor following the disastrous Norway campaign and the B.E.F's near-destruction
prior to the Dunkirk Evacuation, and another Conservative politician, Winston Churchill,
replaced him. Conservatives remained in power, although Churchill integrated Labour and

Goldman, “Press Freedom in Britain During World War II”; Welch, Persuading the People, 22-41, 48-57, 71, 8183; Rose, Which People's War?, 2-4, 14, 29-31. For example, Rose notes that British newspapers in early 1940
called for people to unify and overcome their class differences; the Ministry of Information grew particularly
concerned about the media's portrayal of class differences, and sought to minimize or downplay these class
conflicts through propaganda. Rose, Which People's War?, 31-36.
31
Robert Self, The Evolution of the British Party System, 1885-1940 (Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2000),
200; Andrew Thorpe, Parties at War: Political Organization in Second World War Britain (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2009), 1.
32
Liberals were once the main opposition party to Conservatives, but they were largely politically replaced by
Labour in that role during the mid-1920s. Labour gained more political power due to the expansion of male
suffrage and the increased significance of class consciousness, which led more voters to the left-wing Labour
Party. Justin Fisher, British Political Parties (London: Prentice Hall, 1996), 10.
30
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Liberal politicians into his cabinet to increase popular support for the war.33
In order to explore the commonalities and divergences in British media more effectively,
I have chosen several newspapers each from London, the Southwest, and the North, with
multiple representative papers from each of the three major political leanings in wartime Britain.
Beginning with the London papers, the Daily Herald, originally founded as a socialist
newspaper, eventually came under the control of the Labour Party and Trades Union Congress. 34
The left-leaning tabloid Daily Mirror remained “a favorite with the working classes and rank and
file troops” in the British military.35 In contrast, the Illustrated London News and The Sphere
both held Conservative leanings, published weekly with more of a focus on world events.36
My research focused on three papers in the Southwest, from the cities of Gloucester and
Bristol. The Gloucester Citizen, a tabloid founded by a local businessman, received criticism for
not being sufficiently patriotic.37 Circulated throughout Gloucester and the surrounding region,
the Western Daily Press was founded by a Liberal M.P. and expressed Liberal leanings in its
reporting.38 Also in the Southwest, local subscribers in the Bristol area created the Bristol

33

Self, The Evolution of the British Party System, 200-201; Fisher, British Political Parties, 10.
The Daily Herald was published from 1912-1964, when the newspaper was turned into The Sun. “Daily Herald,”
British Newspaper Archive, Publication Information, accessed June 15, 2018,
<https://www.britishnewspaperarchive.co.uk/titles/daily-herald>.
35
The Daily Mirror was considered “irreverent and brash.” Government censors warned the paper several times
throughout the war. Goldman, “Press Freedom in Britain During World War II.”
36
The Illustrated London News, founded in 1842 as the “world's first illustrated newspaper,” focused more on topics
such as world news, political issues, science and the arts, with more comprehensive stories than daily papers. The
Sphere was founded in 1900 by a former editor of the Illustrated London News. “Illustrated London News,”
British Newspaper Archive, Publication Information, accessed June 15, 2018,
<https://www.britishnewspaperarchive.co.uk/titles/illustrated-london-news>; “The Sphere,” British Newspaper
Archive, Publication Information, accessed June 15, 2018,
<https://www.britishnewspaperarchive.co.uk/titles/the-sphere>.
37
Samuel Bland, a Gloucester area businessman and politician, founded the Gloucester Citizen in 1876. The paper
was criticized by Conservative press for not being patriotic enough, and eventually it became a tabloid
newspaper. As the Citizen was pro-business and right-leaning but was also criticized by Conservatives, it was
presumably Liberal-leaning politically. “Gloucester Citizen,” British Newspaper Archive, Publication
Information, accessed June 15, 2018, <https://www.britishnewspaperarchive.co.uk/titles/gloucester-citizen>.
38
The Western Daily Press was founded in 1858 by journalists Peter Stewart McIver, a Liberal M.P., and Walter
Reid, the paper's first editor and strong advocate for freedom of the press. “Western Daily Press,” British
Newspaper Archive, Publication Information, accessed June 15, 2018,
34

10

Evening Post, which held financial ties with a Conservative and pro-Nazi publisher.39
In the Northern region, I examined four newspapers from Liverpool and Manchester.
Despite the area being fairly split between Conservative and Liberal supporters, many of these
papers displayed Liberal political leanings.40 The Liverpool Daily Post, described as “staunchly
Liberal,” was founded by a local Chief Constable with anti-tax views.41 The Liverpool Echo,
founded in the 1870s, expressed similar Liberal-leaning views.42 In contrast, the Liverpool
Evening Express supported “Conservative interests in the city.”43 A wealthy businessman and
failed Liberal politician founded the Manchester Evening News, which experienced success as it
promoted a Liberal-leaning viewpoint.44
Overall, these eleven newspapers represented a significant cross-section of views from

<https://www.britishnewspaperarchive.co.uk/titles/western-daily-press>.
The Bristol Evening Post formed when many other Bristol papers shut down and interested subscribers in the area
came together to start a new paper. The publication was also financially affiliated with Lord Rothermere, a
Conservative publisher with some controversial pro-Nazi sympathies. “The Bristol Evening Post PLC,” National
Archives, accessed June 16, 2018, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20120120052351/
http://www.competition-commission.org.uk//rep_pub/reports/1990/fulltext/274c3.pdf>; Richard Norton-Taylor,
“Months Before War, Rothemere Said Hitler's Work Was Superhuman,” The Guardian, March 31, 2005,
accessed June 15, 2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/media/2005/apr/01/
pressandpublishing.secondworldwar>.
40
Specifically, Liverpool was fairly Conservative-leaning, while Manchester featured more support for Liberal
politics. “Liverpool Evening Express,” Gutted Arcades of the Past Blog, accessed June 15, 2018,
<http://guttedarcades.blogspot.com/2012/08/liverpool-evening-express.html>; “Manchester Evening News,”
British Newspaper Archive, Publication Information, accessed June 15, 2018,
<https://www.britishnewspaperarchive.co.uk/titles/manchester-evening-news>.
41
The Liverpool Daily Post was founded in 1855 by James Whitty, a local Chief Constable who had campaigned
against the taxation of newspapers. “1855 and the Liverpool Daily Post Begins Publication,” Liverpool Echo,
accessed June 16, 2018, <https://www.liverpoolecho.co.uk/news/liverpool-news/1855-liverpool-daily-postbegins-3369216>.
42
“Liverpool Echo,” British Newspaper Archive, Publication Information, accessed June 16, 2018,
<https://www.britishnewspaperarchive.co.uk/titles/liverpool-echo>; “1855 and the Liverpool Daily Post Begins
Publication,” Liverpool Echo, accessed June 16, 2018, <https://www.liverpoolecho.co.uk/news/liverpoolnews/1855-liverpool-daily-post-begins-3369216>.
43
The Liverpool Evening Express was the “first evening newspaper” in Liverpool. Founded in 1870, the paper
eventually ceased publication after a merger with the Liverpool Echo in the 1950s. “Liverpool Evening Express,”
Gutted Arcades of the Past Blog, accessed June 15, 2018, <http://guttedarcades.blogspot.com/2012/08/liverpoolevening-express.html>.
44
The Manchester Evening News was founded in 1868 by Mitchell Henry, an upper-class businessman who
eventually ran unsuccessfully for Parliament as a Liberal candidate. The Liberal-leaning paper became “the
biggest selling provincial evening newspaper in Britain.” “Manchester Evening News,” British Newspaper
Archive, Publication Information, accessed June 15, 2018,
<https://www.britishnewspaperarchive.co.uk/titles/manchester-evening-news>.
39
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the wartime British press. This group included four newspapers from London, three papers from
the Southwest, and four papers from the North, with each region featuring fairly equal
representation. This aided my analysis of both the commonalities between papers and the
regional divergences expressed in each paper's wartime articles. This group of papers also
included a diverse range of political views, featuring two left-wing papers, four Conservative
papers, and five Liberal papers. I attempted to find greater balance in the political leanings of
papers in my research group, but I discovered that Liberal-leaning newspapers appeared to be
much more common than other political leanings. Local businessmen, who were more inclined
to support the economically right-wing Liberal Party, founded many of these papers, which may
explain this imbalance. In addition, left-wing papers were much more difficult to find, perhaps
due to the lack of support among business owners for left-wing causes. Nevertheless, examining
2-5 papers from each political leaning facilitated a useful comparison of political views among
the British wartime press.
Although I only examined papers from London, the North, and the Southwest, my
conclusions about the regional and political variation between publications from these areas is
also applicable to other regions’ newspapers in Britain. My case study of these three specific
regions presents trends in the media discourse which may be applicable in a broader context for
British newspapers during the early war period. Across the nation, many newspapers during the
first two months of the war exhibited both divergences and similarities in their own particular
regional viewpoints, regarding which topics each regional paper focused on as well as
disagreement on certain topics based on geography or political alignment. If I continued my
research beyond my current analysis, examining papers from additional British regions would
allow for further comparison between different areas of the nation during this period, considering
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more regional viewpoints on these issues.
My research focused on these eleven newspapers from three British regions during 19391941, when the Home Front experienced many problematic events. I analyzed these papers in
three different time periods, covering the early months after the declaration of war;
Chamberlain's political fall and the Dunkirk Evacuation; and the Blitz. Chapter 1 covers papers
from September 1939 – January 1940, focusing primarily on the British declaration of war and
the domestic evacuation of children from the cities to the countryside. This chapter features
mostly unified perspectives in the media's description and coverage of both the war declaration
and the domestic evacuation, with some regional divergences regarding which aspects of defense
preparation each region focused on. Chapter 2 examines publications from February-August
1940, with particular emphasis on Chamberlain's political failures and replacement by Churchill
as well as the near-disastrous Dunkirk Evacuation. Papers from this period exhibited significant
political differences in the coverage of Chamberlain's failures, but the coverage unified during
Dunkirk and the rescue of the B.E.F. from the Continent. Finally, Chapter 3 covers September
1940 – May 1941, when German bombers ravaged British cities during the Blitz. This chapter
reveals the similar viewpoints in the media's coverage of German bombings, as government
control increased and papers began to follow state narratives of the war more closely. Some
regional and political differences remained, with varying focus given to particular bombing
attacks, and dissimilar portrayals of class issues. Nevertheless, this unity of the wartime British
press carried forward from Dunkirk into the coverage of the Blitz.
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CHAPTER ONE: EARLY UNITY IN WARTIME PRESS (SEPTEMBER
1939 – JANUARY 1940)

This chapter examines newspaper coverage of two key events during the first five months
of World War II: the declaration of war & initial preparations for the conflict and the domestic
evacuation of children from major cities to the countryside. Coverage of these events set the
stage for British newspapers’ participation in the national media discourse during World War II,
reflecting the main state narrative of the war as well as revealing the underlying anxieties of the
British Home Front during the early war period.
First, I will discuss newspapers immediately following the declaration of war on
Germany in early September 1939. This section is divided into several parts based on each of the
main themes in these articles, including the war declaration itself, the nation’s defensive
preparations, government-imposed restrictions on the Home Front, and the encouragement of
anti-German sentiment. Articles on each of these early war themes mostly displayed a unified
point of view, supporting state narratives of the war and extolling British virtues. Despite this
early unity, some regional divergences also surfaced in these early articles, as papers from
London, the Southwest, and the North focused more particularly on certain issues. London
publications highlighted the defensive preparations against German attacks, while regional
papers in the Southwest and North shifted their attention toward restrictions imposed on the
Home Front, such as rationing and blackouts. Anti-German rhetoric also featured more
prominently in Southwestern and Northern papers.
14

In the next section, I will examine coverage of the domestic evacuation of children from
major British cities to the countryside. Articles on the domestic evacuation also featured unified
views supporting the British government’s position regarding the operation. Newspapers in all
three of these regions minimized problems with the domestic evacuation and attempted to focus
on optimistic portrayals of it. These newspaper reports also revealed the deep anxieties of the
Home Front regarding the displacement of so many young people within the nation. Articles
from London included more concern regarding the separation of children from their parents,
many of whom were in London and other major cities, while articles from other regions placed
more prominence on the integration of evacuated children into their new countryside homes.
When newspapers discussed problematic issues, they often blamed the evacuated children rather
than criticizing the government or the host families in receiving areas.
Overall, British media coverage of the war declaration & preparations and the domestic
evacuation featured a large amount of unity from journalists in these three regions. Newspapers
usually supported the government’s viewpoint and remained optimistic about the coming war,
with some regional differences on their topics of focus. This unity of the press during the first
five months of the war emerged at least in part due to the state narratives of the war, as well as
journalists’ desire to support the war effort, appear patriotic and avoid future censorship.

Declaration of War
The Allied declaration of war on September 3, 1939 garnered a largely positive reaction
from British newspapers and the general public.45 The government established the Ministry of
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Information within several days of the war declaration, with Sir John Reith at its head. During
this early period of the war, the Ministry mostly utilized a system of “voluntary censorship,”
before later transitioning to greater control of the press under Duff Cooper’s leadership in
Summer 1940. One notable exception to this relatively lax censorship policy came on September
11, 1939, just a few days after the declaration of war. The Ministry initially approved several
newspaper articles which reported on the arrival of the B.E.F. in France, but military officials
grew concerned about the strategic information revealed in these articles, and they “forced the
Ministry of Information to apply retrospective censorship” to these issues. Police officers seized
newspapers at offices around the nation in order to prevent these articles from going into
circulation. Eventually, the military, Ministry and media reached a compromise and these papers
resumed normal distribution, with the Ministry of Information resuming its system of voluntary
censorship and minimal involvement in the press for the next several months.46
The media’s initial positivity regarding the war did not come entirely from stateencouraged narratives and censorship, although a fear of being censored certainly played a role
in the media’s coverage. British journalists also sought to inspire the people of the Home Front
and appear patriotic, contributing to the war effort and encouraging the British people while
remaining in good standing with the government.47 British newspapers presented a largely
unified opinion on the war declaration & preparations, with some regional differences regarding
the amount of prominence given to certain issues. Newspaper articles focused on four primary
themes: the declaration of war, the initial defensive preparations, government restrictions, and
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anti-German sentiment.
As we might expect, newspapers from London, the Southwest, and the North all featured
extensive coverage of the Allied declaration of war. Newspapers utilized several similar themes
in reports on this topic, including moral justifications for the war, Britain's stoic determination
and resolve, and calls for social unity and popular support from the Home Front. As Angus
Calder has noted in his history of the Home Front during the war, public morale was a central
component of Britain's success in World War II.48 Newspapers felt motivated to contribute to the
war effort and remain in line with the government in anticipation of future censorship. Both the
press and government viewed Home Front morale as critical for the war effort.49
The moral justification of Britain's involvement in the war became an important issue for
public morale from the start. According to A.J.P. Taylor, only “the British and French could boast
that they alone joined the crusade for freedom of their own free will.”50 Taylor further noted the
nobility of Britain's cause in the war, as this idea of a crusade against the fascist enemies became
entrenched in British ideas of the war later in the conflict.51 British newspapers extensively
focused on this moral justification, as some articles placed the blame for the war entirely on
Germany, portraying the Nazi state as a morally indefensible nation fighting against the righteous
British people.52 Other reports focused more on Britain’s failed attempts at diplomacy, noting the
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necessity of military force to finish the struggle.53 These articles contained extremely patriotic
and inspirational language, with grandiose claims of a united Britain struggling to free all of
Europe from Nazi tyranny.54 This nationalistic language exemplified the underlying need for the
press and government to improve Home Front morale and popular support for the war.
Newspapers also emphasized British stoicism and resolve to persevere in the war. British
social historian Arthur Marwick discussed the central idea of this theme in his history of the
Home Front, noting that from the very start of the war, civilians on the Home Front displayed
“that much-vaunted British calm,” acting “quite orderly” even during the trying times of the
war.55 Newspapers grasped this theme of stoic British citizens who would remain calm during
the war, linking it with historical ideas of British perseverance.
Some of these articles focused particularly on the stoic attitude, preparedness, and calm
demeanor of British citizens, emphasizing that these traits would contribute to Britain's success
in the war.56 Other articles emphasized aspects of the British state as a whole, with assertions that
Britain's resolve would allow the nation to prevail against Germany.57 Some reports also paired
this with a particularly optimistic outlook on the war, inspiring readers on the Home Front with a
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positive view of the war effort.58 Newspapers placed importance on the presence of British allies
in the struggle as well. Several articles emphasized that Britain was supported in the war by
France and the rest of the British Empire.59 This emphasis on the support of allies attempted to
assuage anxieties on the Home Front about the difficulties presented by the war.60
Many papers also focused on social unity and popular support for the war. According to
British historian Sonya O. Rose, this became the most important component of the Home Front
during the first several months of the war. Rose asserted that media discourse in Britain
“centrally featured the idea that the members of the national community were self-sacrificing
citizens.”61 Angus Calder also noted the significance of these calls for social unity and sacrifice
on the Home Front, as the government encouraged British people to contribute to this “people's
war.”62 One of the British government's main goals in the Home Front was to promote this idea
that British citizens themselves were “soldiers in the front line,” directly aiding the war effort
with their participation and sacrifice.63
British newspapers helped propagate this idea of a people’s war, with some articles
emphasizing broad support and popular excitement for the war, in an effort to encourage further
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contribution.64 These claims of popular support from the moment of the war declaration were not
necessarily accurate in a broad context, but instead described crowds and popular sentiments in
the immediate public reaction to the declaration. During the early months of the war, the British
government still worried about public support for the war effort.65 Other articles more explicitly
called for contribution to this people's war, often asserting that the British people should ignore
class differences and combine their efforts to bring greater social unity to the Home Front.66
While newspaper articles asserted the need for unity, pervasive class problems still remained,
and continued to be an issue for the duration of the conflict.67 In this sense, these articles were
more reflective of the British government and media's desire for social unity and the
minimization of class differences, as class conflicts remained one of the most concerning
potential sources of negative morale on the Home Front.68 In addition, many of the newspapers
calling for social unity and the disregarding of class differences were Conservative-leaning,
which cast a negative light on these inspirational articles. Conservatives tended to be more
supportive of the upper-class and nobility, while the working class leaned more toward the
Labour Party. Consequently, Conservatives calling for social unity appeared as rich elites calling
for workers to forget their grievances and get in line.69
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Articles on the war declaration utilized themes such as moral justification, British
stoicism, and calls for social unity and contribution. These themes highlighted the remarkable
amount of unity present among British newspapers during this period, due in part to the British
government's control of the flow of information, as well as the willingness of those papers to
appear patriotic, supportive, and in good standing with the government. In addition, this unity of
British newspaper coverage on the war declaration revealed the anxieties and concerns of British
citizens on the Home Front, which these articles attempted to address.

Defensive Preparations
As the nation prepared for war, the looming threat of German bombing presented a major
concern for British cities. Propaganda historian David Welch noted that this issue “was a priority
for the government” from the very start of hostilities, particularly regarding “the devastating
impact air raids could have on civilian morale.”70 Due to this potential threat to Home Front
morale, the government focused on defensive preparations such as creating several committees,
defense groups, and emergency services while calling for civilian volunteers.71
The British media also focused on air raid defenses and military mobilization.72 British
citizens grew very concerned about the prospect of German air raids on London and other major
cities. English novelist Margery Allingham wrote that she “expected London to be razed in a
British political parties during the war, see Fisher, British Political Parties, 10; Self, The Evolution of the British
Party System, 200-201; Thorpe, Parties at War, 1-8.
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week,” and such excessive views of the possibility of German bombings were shared by some
citizens on the Home Front.73 Olivia Cockett, a British woman who lived in London for the war's
duration, wrote in her diary that people in the capital city were very fearful of air raids at the start
of the war, and this fear was amplified by several false air raid alarms.74 This deep concern
regarding German air raids also drew on British citizens' experiences during World War I, as
British historian Susan Grayzel noted in her study of air raid culture in Britain during both world
wars. According to Grayzel, German air raids during World War I destroyed the separation
between the home front and war front, forcing civilians to realize that they were part of the war
and could be attacked at any moment.75
Newspapers reflected both the government's concern regarding air raids as well as the
anxiety among people on the Home Front. Some articles focused on the general threat of air
raids, beginning with the false air raid alarm on London immediately after the declaration of
war.76 Reports on this false alarm emphasized that Londoners kept calm and that there was no
panic about the potential air raid, attempting to assuage readers' anxiety about the possibility of
further raids.77 Coverage also focused on defensive preparations against future raids, the
implementation of air raid procedures & safety guidelines, and a general focus on British
military strength and buildup. Regional divergences emerged in these articles, as London papers
73
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focused more on anti-air defense preparations, while Northern and Southwestern papers
concentrated on air raid procedures and the general military buildup.
Articles from London papers highlighted the threat of air raids and the construction of
sufficient anti-air defenses for the protection of the capital city. Even during World War I,
London had been the focus of German bombing attacks, and many predicted that this would be
the case in the Second World War as well.78 In response to these anxieties on the Home Front,
London newspapers extolled Britain's defensive preparations for the war.79 These articles focused
on London's defenses against German bombers specifically, examining anti-aircraft guns,
projectors, and operators.80
In contrast to these London papers, articles in the Southwest and North placed more
emphasis on air raid procedures and guidelines for citizens' safety. According to Susan Grayzel,
the British government attempted to make air raid awareness and precautions a “part of everyday
life” for the Home Front.81 Southwestern and Northern papers followed the government's lead in
this area and published several articles after the war declaration emphasizing the importance of
regional air raid precautions. Articles from Southwestern publications made citizens aware of air
raid procedures, especially for children, as well as post-raid cleanup and recovery guidelines.82
Northern reports displayed similar concerns regarding these procedures.83 The higher emphasis
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on air raid guidelines instead of anti-air defenses in these two regions indicates that Northern and
Southwestern papers felt less concerned with reassuring readers' fears of bombing attacks, and
more focused on preparing for how those attacks would affect the region.
Coverage also focused more generally on the British military strength and buildup in
anticipation of the conflict with Germany. The Ministry of Information utilized the might of
Britain's military in propaganda, deciding months before the war that this would be one of their
major areas of focus on the Home Front.84 Consequently, this emphasis on military strength
featured prominently in articles from all regions. They emphasized that the British military was
fully mobilizing its forces and was ready to face Germany in the war.85 Some articles also noted
the expansion of military service among older age groups, as well as early British military
operations.86 This focus on British defensive preparations and military strength reveals the unity
present in British media discourse during the first five months of the war, as papers followed the
government’s lead and attempted to assuage readers’ anxieties about the topic.

Government Restrictions
At the start of the war, the British government recognized that food, gasoline, and other
critical supplies could become an issue for Britain during the war, and consequently
implemented a rationing system. The government began issuing rationing books immediately in
September 1939. Gasoline was rationed from the start, while foods such as butter, sugar, and
84
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meat began rationing in January 1940. Even printing paper fell under the rationing system,
leading to difficulties for book publishers.87 In addition, the government imposed other
restrictions on the British people as well, including blackouts during the nighttime, designed to
prevent German bombers from easily targeting British cities and towns.88 Many British citizens
grew concerned about these restrictions, and papers discussed both rationing and blackouts
extensively in articles during the first several months of the war. These restrictions also became a
central focus for the Ministry of Information, as the government recognized that these measures
could be unpopular.89 Coverage of rationing and blackouts largely featured a unified viewpoint,
with some specific regional concerns.
Rationing became one of the most potentially problematic issues on the Home Front
during the first five months of the war.90 Not only did it cause citizens to worry about dwindling
supplies and rising prices, but rationing also led to class problems, as it was much more arduous
for the lower classes than the rich elites in Britain. According to Sonya O. Rose, food supplies
and rationing were “a focal point of 'class feeling'” during the war, causing resentment of both
the government and the upper class.91 But the government recognized this issue and utilized
propaganda, soft censorship, and the encouragement of the press in order to make rationing more
popular. This eventually worked, and the British people accepted the system of rationing within a
few months of its implementation.92 Despite this eventual acceptance, people still worried about
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rationing, and papers in the North and Southwest attempted to assuage those readers' anxieties.
Southwestern and Northern reports examined how rationing could impact local residents.
In response to fears of food shortage and rationing, some of this coverage told readers that
sufficient reserves existed for their particular region, as well as noting the government’s
measures to prevent hoarding and price gouging.93 Other articles explained the rationing system
to readers so that they could understand it and eventually become comfortable with the system.94
Many of these articles focused primarily on the rationing of food products and petrol.95 These
reports conformed to the expectations of the Ministry of Information, minimizing concerns over
the rationing system and educating the Home Front about it.96
The issue of blackouts received more backlash, particularly in regional areas which did
not expect to be as heavily bombed as London. Blackouts caused many problems for civilians
during the early months of the war. The amount of travel declined, roads became more
dangerous, and towns cancelled local celebrations.97 The lack of bombing during the first several
months of the war led to further frustration for British citizens, making the restriction seem
needless and imposing. Due to this lack of German bombing, the government eventually relaxed
the blackout rules until bombing began in earnest during the Battle of Britain and the Blitz.98
Blackouts also proved inconvenient for residents of London and other major cities. Olivia
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Cockett noted in her diary that Londoners often complained about blackouts imposed by the
government. She described her experience of “[b]lacking out windows, living in gloom, not
sleeping... that ever dreadful feeling that so much worse may be to come.”99 In the North, a
Birmingham woman complained in her diary that blackout impositions began in early September
1939, lamenting that many Birmingham residents did not understand the blackout rules and that
they made certain events such as thunderstorms more frightening.100
Similar to rationing reports, newspapers discussed blackouts in an educational and
positive manner, conforming with government expectations. Some papers provided instructions
for civilian residents and motorists, advising them on how to prepare for blackouts and what
types of activities to avoid.101 In addition to instruction, articles also included retrospective
summaries for how previous blackout trials went, and encouraged local citizens to do better.102
These articles avoided harsh criticism of the blackout system, and generally attempted to be
helpful and informative. The presence and tone of these articles also indicated that blackouts
caused concern on the Home Front, and that the government and press utilized these reports in an
attempt to address those concerns.
Coverage of these government restrictions highlighted the importance of those issues to
the Home Front, and the need for newspapers to address these anxieties. British citizens'
concerns mostly focused on food consumption and the disparate impacts of these government
measures on different classes.103 Some regional differences persisted in articles on this subject,
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but most of the coverage expressed largely the same views. The British government invested in
ensuring the smooth operation of blackouts and rationing, and these government restrictions only
increased as the war continued.

Anti-German Sentiment
British newspapers encouraged anti-German sentiment on the Home Front through
articles focusing on the German sinking of the British ship Athenia in early Sept. 1939, the
internment of ethnic Germans in Britain, and generally negative portrayals of Germany. Northern
and Southwestern papers concentrated more on anti-German sentiment than other areas, perhaps
due to increased xenophobia and lack of exposure to foreigners as compared with the capital
city.104 The British government officially encouraged these anti-German views, and the Ministry
of Information focused on justifying the war by blaming Germany for it.105 This anti-German
propaganda and state narrative increased as the war dragged on, and the government eventually
shifted to more outright demonization of the entire German population.106
The sinking of the British ship Athenia by a German U-Boat on September 3, 1939
received especially prominent press coverage. Many reports utilized this event to encourage antiGerman sentiment, often making comparisons to the German sinking of the Lusitania in World
War I, which helped lead to the United States' entry into that war.107 Newspapers utilized similar
reporting strategies from articles on the Lusitania sinking, asserting that the Germans violated
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international rules of warfare with the Athenia attack and publishing the recollections of Athenia
survivors in an effort to encourage anti-German sentiment.108 Northern coverage emphasized that
the Athenia had stopped at port in Liverpool before it was destroyed, making the sinking more
personal for local readers.109
Papers also encouraged anti-German sentiment in their coverage of the review and
internment of all German and Austrian aliens residing in Britain, often portraying these people as
hostile security risks who were justifiably targeted.110 A.J.P. Taylor asserted that this internment
occurred almost immediately after the declaration of war, and most of the interned Germans were
Jews and political refugees who had fled Germany to escape Nazi persecution.111 Reports on this
internment supported the government's actions, asserting that the internment protected the British
people from hostile German aliens.112
Newspapers sought to draw on negative ideas about Germany forged in World War I
propaganda. They reminded readers that Germany bore the “sole responsibility” for starting the
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current war, just as the Versailles Treaty placed the blame for World War I on Germany.113 This
conformed to the government's Home Front goals, as the Ministry of Information justified the
war by placing the blame on Nazi Germany.114 Papers also compared the situation in 1939 to
World War I more generally. After the British declaration of war, the Daily Mirror noted that the
1914 declaration was marked by “summer sunshine... through open windows,” while in 1939,
“the windows were darkened against air raids. This time were was no singing.”115 Portrayals such
as these did not directly depict Germans in a negative or xenophobic manner, or even at all – but
the mere comparison of the situation to World War I, when an entire generation of young British
men were killed in another conflict with Germany, led readers to recall their previous antiGerman sentiments with renewed fervor.
Newspapers early in the war generally presented Germans as enemies who should be
feared and resented. The British government supported and encouraged these portrayals,
increasing anti-German state narratives as the war progressed. This anti-German sentiment
attempted to improve Home Front morale and increase support for the war effort.116
Overall, these first five months of the war featured a largely unified media discourse
focusing on the declaration itself, defensive preparations, government restrictions, and antiGerman sentiment. Some regions placed more prominence on different issues, but newspapers in
all regions utilized these themes to discuss the early war events.117 These articles also revealed
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the concerns and anxieties of the British people living in each region, and many of the articles
attempted to assuage these concerns. The government focused on Home Front morale during this
period, with soft censorship and encouragement for papers to conform to their expectations on
these issues. Newspapers mostly followed these expectations, presenting issues in a favorable
manner for the government.118

The Domestic Evacuation
In addition to the war declaration and preparations, newspapers reported on the domestic
evacuation of British children in early September 1939. The British government initially divided
the nation into evacuation areas, receiving areas, and unaffected neutral areas, each representing
roughly a third of the population. Evacuation areas included London and other major cities,
while receiving areas mostly contained less populated areas of Britain. The remainder of the
country comprised neutral areas, which did not send or receive evacuees during the population
transfer. At the government's direction, millions of British people, mostly children and other
vulnerable segments of the population, traveled from London and other cities in evacuation areas
to the rural receiving areas.119 When German bombing did not begin as soon as anticipated, many
of these evacuated children ended up returning to the cities by early 1940.120
British historian Robert Mackay described the domestic evacuation as “a potent source of
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resentment... at odds with the official campaign to promote social solidarity” and unite the public
in support of the war.121 Due to this potential threat to the Home Front’s morale, the British
government committed itself to the success of the operation, encouraging newspapers to portray
it in a positive manner by utilizing soft censorship and the control of press information.
Newspapers went along with the government's goals regarding the evacuation out of a desire to
appear patriotic and supportive as well as fear of censorship.122
Coverage of the domestic evacuation mostly portrayed it as a successful operation with
positive experiences for the evacuees, minimizing or ignoring some of its difficulties. When
papers discussed problems with the evacuation, they often blamed the evacuated children rather
than the government or the receiving host families. Many evacuees wrote in letters and diaries
that they had unpleasant experiences during the evacuation, but they did not receive prominent
media attention.123 Articles on the domestic evacuation generally focused on three themes,
including the operational aspects of the population transfer, the evacuated children’s separation
from their parents & assimilation into new areas, and criticism of the children for any failures
associated with the evacuation.
Reports on the evacuation’s operational features generally followed the government’s
narrative, which presented it as a highly organized “triumph of calm and order,” utilizing “an
elaborate system of banners, armlets and labels” to direct evacuees to their trains and buses for
transport to their respective receiving areas.124 Many reports emphasized the unprecedented
nature of the operation, with the Daily Herald describing it as “[o]ne of the greatest mass
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movements in history.”125 Publications also extolled the evacuation's speed, progression, and
well-planned nature, attempting to inspire readers’ support.126 The overwhelming praise in many
of these articles indicated that newspapers tried to at least provide the appearance of an organized
government operation.127
Some articles ran counter to these uniformly positive portrayals, particularly in receiving
areas, as paper noted that supply problems could still be an issue for the evacuation, particularly
housing shortages due to the influx of new arrivals in the countryside.128 This lack of living
space became a recurring problem in receiving areas, leading to overcrowding and difficult
situations for both the evacuees and host families.129 One article in the Western Daily Press told
residents in this receiving area that ample supplies and air raid protections existed for the
children, attempting to reassure both local residents and the parents of evacuees that supply
shortages would not be an issue.130 Papers in evacuation areas addressed these supply issues as
well, with the Daily Herald noting that each evacuee should bring food rations, gas mask and a
spare change of clothes on their journey.131
In addition to evacuation’s organization, reports also focused on the evacuated children’s
departure from parents and their integration into rural areas. Many residents in evacuation areas
worried about their separation from the evacuated children, particularly Londoners, as more
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children evacuated from the capital city than any other British urban areas. Olivia Cockett
discussed this issue in her wartime diary, noting that the operation caused “major upheavals” in
London residents' lives and that mothers of evacuated children acted very stoic during the
evacuation.132 Coverage in evacuation areas such as London, Manchester, and Liverpool
addressed these concerns. London papers mostly focused on the parents' separation from their
children, emphasizing the parents’ heroic sacrifice as well as their relief for the children’s
safety.133 Papers in Liverpool and Manchester also noted these farewells, but focused more on
the evacuees' assimilation into the evacuated areas in the countryside. These articles often
described the evacuated children as happy in their new surroundings, attempting to reassure
parents in these major cities that their sons and daughters were safe.134 Coverage generally
portrayed the evacuation as “a rather exciting adventure,” including many “obviously set-up
pictures showing the children as happy, and the organization as impeccable.”135
In reception areas such as Gloucester, and neutral areas such as Bristol, papers placed
more emphasis on the caring for newly arrived evacuated children from the city.136 Reports in
these areas featured appeals for the people in reception areas to welcome the evacuees and take
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care of them.137 Some articles also focused on how the evacuated children should behave in their
new homes, with requests for them to be courageous and obedient for their new families.138
These types of articles tried to reassure local residents of the receiving areas that they would not
have to deal with constantly misbehaving children.139
While these reports described the evacuees’ experiences in leaving their families and
attempting to assimilate into receiving areas, they failed to provide an adequate viewpoint from
the evacuated children themselves. Evacuees wrote in diaries, letters and memoirs about their
difficult experiences in the evacuation, but these views did not often appear in newspapers at the
time, as the media generally sided with the government and the host families. In this
correspondence, evacuees mostly expressed fear, sadness, and a desire to return home. One
evacuated boy wrote to his father that he wanted to return to the city, because he “would rather
come home than endure the situation any longer.”140 In a collection of Mass Observation diaries,
an older evacuated woman lamented that she was “treated like bits of dirt by the locals,” and
consequently planned to come home.141 Some evacuated children experienced separation anxiety
and felt unsafe, with one boy recalling that he had trouble sleeping after being evacuated.142 A
British cartoonist, Mel Calman, later recalled his experiences as a child during the domestic
evacuation, noting his confusion and loss of identity as he was sent off to the countryside.143
These letters and memories indicated that, for evacuees, class differences could often
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negate any otherwise positive aspects of the evacuation. Many of these lower-class children
hailed from such economically disadvantaged backgrounds that they brought nothing on their
trip, arriving “dirty, tearful and exhausted” in the countryside after a long trip with minimal
supplies.144 As these recollections expressed, many of the evacuees felt embarrassed by the
situation created by these class differences, and found it difficult to pay for their own supplies. In
the most extreme cases, some evacuees even experienced physical or sexual abuse.145
Several British historians have asserted that these class differences underlay most of the
domestic evacuation’s difficulties, as most of the evacuees came from working-class or lowerclass families, while their host families in receiving areas often came from the middle or upperclass. This created a situation of strong class conflict, as some evacuees found themselves
separated from their siblings, forced to perform unpaid work for their host families, or generally
looked down upon.146 These class differences led to problems between the evacuated children
and the host families & other people in receiving areas. These class issues could be seen more
indirectly in some articles on the evacuated children’s treatment in receiving areas, as one
Manchester Evening News story noted that locals gave money to a young evacuee and his friend,
raising issues of the children’s lack of monetary support but presenting it in a positive manner. 147
When newspapers discussed these conflicts between evacuees and host families, they
often criticized the evacuated children, utilizing this theme to blame the evacuees themselves for
the problems. This criticism generally took the viewpoint of host families and other people in the
receiving areas. Robert Mackay noted that these “horror stories” described “the intolerable
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experiences of country hosts trying to cope with dirty and foul-mouthed slum children unused to
parental control,” which summed up many of the complaints in these articles.148 These
complaints generally centered on the evacuees' poor hygiene, improper behavior, and general
failure to assimilate into the receiving areas.149 Some locals in reception areas grew resentful of
having to support the influx of lower-class children. The government paid host families a
minimal allowance for housing the children, but many of them felt that it was insufficient for
their effort and expenses.150 Arthur Marwick asserted that “many newspapers published reports
critical of the evacuees, totally uncomprehending of the appalling slum conditions which had
created their predicament.”151 These articles did not focus on the class differences which led to
the conflict between the evacuated children and their host families, instead blaming the children
without this needed context. This complied with the Ministry of Information's goals, encouraging
a united front to support the war while minimizing potentially divisive class differences.152
Overall, coverage of the domestic evacuation mostly followed the governmentencouraged narrative, presenting a unified and optimistic view of its operational aspects and the
children's experiences. Papers in evacuation areas focused more on reassuring the parents of
evacuated children, while reception area reports emphasized the newly arrived evacuees’ need to
assimilate. Some articles noted problems with the evacuation, but blamed the evacuated children
rather than the government or host families in receiving areas. Class differences caused the most
discord between evacuated children and their new hosts, but coverage did not highlight these
issues, and the evacuees’ viewpoints often went unheard by the general public, confined largely
to private diaries and letters. Papers mentioned other problematic issues such as the need for
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additional housing and supplies but did not place as much prominence on these difficulties as
compared with their positive portrayals of the evacuation. One of the worst aspects of the
evacuation was the lack of bombing raids for the first few months of the war, making these
hardships seem pointless. Many evacuees returned to London and other major cities after a few
months, only to evacuate again when the Blitz started in September 1940.153

British newspaper reports during the first five months of the war largely displayed unity
in portrayals of the war declaration & preparations and the domestic evacuation of children from
the cities. The British government encouraged newspapers to support their goals of Home Front
morale and popular support of the war, through the use of soft censorship, controlling the flow of
information to the media, and the early beginnings of the Ministry’s propaganda system.
Newspapers also went along with the government's goals because appearing patriotic and
supportive of the war would lead to less risk of censorship in the future.154 Throughout these
unified portrayals of the declaration of war and domestic evacuation, regional and political
differences occasionally surfaced. Different regions of Britain focused more on certain aspects of
the war during this early period, and evacuation areas displayed dissimilar concerns regarding
the domestic evacuation compared to receiving areas or neutral areas. As the war progressed, the
Ministry of Information's censorship increased and its usage of propaganda became more
pervasive as well, particularly after the Dunkirk Evacuation.155

153

Mackay, Half the Battle, 50.
Welch, Persuading the People, 12-17, 48; Rose, Which People's War?, 2-4, 14; Mackay, Half the Battle, 46.
155
Taylor, British Propaganda in the Twentieth Century, 157-160.
154

38

CHAPTER TWO: INCREASING GOVERNMENT CONTROL AND
POLITICAL DIVERGENCE (FEBRUARY – AUGUST 1940)

After the early wartime unity of the British media, in the midst of the Phony War period,
old political and regional divisions resurfaced in the press. These divisions primarily concerned
the controversy over Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain’s wartime leadership, as well as Allied
setbacks in the war. After the inactivity of the first five months of the war, in April 1940, British
forces finally came into direct conflict with the German war machine in Norway, with disastrous
results. The British public blamed Chamberlain directly for these military failures, and his
political credibility never recovered. All of these events shook the Home Front, as Britons
experienced both fear and anxiety about the war, feeling that the government had failed them. 156
German forces captured key locations across Norway in early April 1940, and although
Allied troops remained in the region for the next month, they never recovered from this early
defeat and eventually abandoned Norway to Nazi control in late May.157 As Chamberlain
continued to lose public and political support after the loss of Norway, he eventually resigned on
May 10, 1940, and Winston Churchill became the new Prime Minister.158 British setbacks
continued under the new government, as Germany invaded the Low Countries and France on
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May 10, 1940. German forces surprised the British Expeditionary Force (B.E.F.) in the northwest
of France, after breaking through Allied lines in the Ardennes. Cut off from its supply lines, the
B.E.F. slowly fell back to the port of Dunkirk. From May 26 to June 5, 1940, Britain scrambled
to organize a rescue operation and save some of the thousands of British soldiers from total
annihilation on the Continent. The Dunkirk Evacuation resulted in British ships saving almost
the entire B.E.F., ferrying over 338,000 British troops back to Britain. British forces ultimately
experienced 66,000 casualties during this early fighting in France and the Low Countries, while
politicians and the media focused more on the large numbers of successfully evacuated troops.159
The press closely covered both Chamberlain's political fall from grace and the Dunkirk
Evacuation. In this chapter, I will examine press coverage of these crises from February to
August 1940 in order to show how political divergences arose in the media discourse, as well as
the increase in government censorship and state-endorsed narratives of the war. Coverage of
Chamberlain's political failures often fell along political lines, with Conservative papers offering
little criticism of the government compared to Liberal and Labour-supported papers. The
Dunkirk Evacuation marked the most significant event of the war in terms of media coverage.
The national media discourse expressed a remarkable unity of coverage regarding Dunkirk, aided
by heightened government propaganda and press interference.
Beginning in April 1940, the Ministry of Information reabsorbed the temporary Press and
Censorship Bureau, beginning extensive propaganda campaigns and more stringent censorship.
Churchill appointed Duff Cooper as the new Minister of Information, and the strained “voluntary
censorship” system of the war's early months transitioned into greater government control over
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the press. The Ministry replaced its previous advisory defense notices to infringing newspaper
articles with more legally forceful orders from a Censorship Board, giving more weight to its
oversight of journalists. Ministry censors also began targeting political opinions in newspaper
articles, not just sensitive military information, as they suppressed the Daily Worker and other
Communist and Fascist publications in Summer 1940. In addition to these draconian measures,
the Ministry of Information continued to utilize soft censorship methods such as the control of
information flow to the media and the encouragement of state narratives in newspapers. During
the Dunkirk Evacuation, Cooper’s Ministry feared that the Home Front would lose confidence in
the war effort, implementing more extensive anti-German propaganda and inspirational
narratives in an attempt to inspire the British people and prevent the rise of defeatism.160

Chamberlain’s Political Decline
From the war's onset in September 1939 until May 1940, Chamberlain's National
Government directed the British war effort, largely controlled by his party, the Conservatives. In
addition to the Conservative majority, the National Government also included representatives
from the Labour and Liberal political parties.161 Despite the failure of Chamberlain's
appeasement of Hitler and the lack of any strong direction in British military strategy,
Chamberlain's government still maintained a reasonable amount of support at the beginning of
1940, perhaps due to increased patriotic sentiment during the early wartime period.162
Chamberlain's cabinet appointments of Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden, influential
Conservative politicians who had previously been critical of him, helped to unify Conservatives,
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while the Labour and Liberal parties experienced more division.163
British military failures in the Norway operation during April and May 1940 severely
weakened Chamberlain's public and political support. By early May, he essentially became
“engaged in two wars: one against Germany, the other against his critics in Parliament.”164 These
critics increasingly taunted Chamberlain, with slogans such as “Missed the bus!” being yelled or
featured in newspaper headlines. Ultimately, Chamberlain received most of the blame for the
British setbacks in Norway, which directly led to his resignation on May 10, 1940 after a further
dwindling of political support.165
During early May 1940, British newspapers frequently reported on the military failures in
Norway, as well as Chamberlain's declining political situation. Coverage focused primarily on
political disapproval or approval of Chamberlain's wartime leadership, with increasing criticism
during Chamberlain’s final days in office, from May 1-10.166 The political leanings of each
newspaper greatly influenced the manner in which they discussed Chamberlain and the failures
in Norway. Conservative papers did not criticize Chamberlain strongly, instead cautioning their
readers against a change in leadership. In contrast, left-wing papers featured more critical
commentary on Chamberlain and the Norway situation, while Liberal papers included more
mixed views on the Prime Minister. These papers pointed out failures in Chamberlain's
leadership, dwindling political support on the Home Front, and poor military decisions in the
Norway campaign. Despite these political divergences, the British press largely remained unified
163
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in recognizing the problems facing Britain in the war during early 1940, merely disagreeing on
the best solution for these problems.
Left-leaning newspapers strongly disapproved of Chamberlain and his government's
direction of the war effort, with increasingly critical remarks from May 1-10, 1940. These leftwing papers also expressed optimism regarding Churchill, Chamberlain's successor. The Daily
Herald's W.N. Ewer and Maurice Webb asserted that the Norway campaign was a disaster, citing
poor leadership and supply problems and noting that the British people were beginning to lose
respect for Chamberlain's government.167 By May 8, 1940, Webb argued that Chamberlain's
resignation was inevitable, mocking his last-minute attempts to build support as pointless.168
Other left-wing articles also focused on Chamberlain's increasingly weakened political position,
eventually including more scathing criticism of the Prime Minister and calling for him to resign,
as well as praise for Labour politicians who refused to participate in any government with
Chamberlain.169 Left-wing papers viewed Churchill with more optimism and confidence than
Chamberlain, despite his Conservative affiliations.170
Conservative papers differed from left-wing papers, notably lacking any strong criticism
of Chamberlain and warning against a change in government. These Conservative publications
also contained a mix of opinions regarding the Norwegian campaign, with some papers putting a
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positive spin on British military failures in Norway, while others criticized the campaign but did
not blame Chamberlain for it. British historian Cyril Falls' weekly column in the Illustrated
London News asserted that Britain could not “make a change for the better in the supreme
leadership of the country,” a surprising position when most other journalists and politicians
viewed Chamberlain's resignation as likely by this time.171
Other Conservative publications called for patience from the Home Front, urging the
British people to remain optimistic with both the government and the direction of the war.172
Conservative papers continued to defend Chamberlain up until his resignation, remaining
doubtful that he would be forced out of government and lamenting the Prime Minister's
increasing unpopularity.173 A weekly column in The Sphere warned that Britain's situation was
comparable to the tumultuous Home Front during World War I, when the public was quick to
blame government leaders for any military failures, and cautioned that the British press should
avoid causing this kind of political disunity in 1940.174 Conservative papers generally attempted
to insulate Chamberlain and the Conservative Party from criticism.
Liberal-leaning publications presented more of a mixed opinion on Chamberlain, falling
in between left-wing and Conservative newspapers. These Liberal publications criticized
Chamberlain's leadership and the government's handling of the Norwegian campaign, but not as
vociferously as left-leaning papers. Regional differences also played more of a role with Liberal
171
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papers, as Southwestern Liberal newspapers moderately criticized the Prime Minister, while
Northern Liberal publications varied from weak criticism to harsh anti-Chamberlain rhetoric.
Liberal papers in the Southwest initially encouraged the British public to be patient and
optimistic about Chamberlain's government and the war effort in Norway.175 This initial
optimism gave way to an increasing amount of criticism and negativity, as Liberal papers in the
region expressed stronger disapproval of Chamberlain and the setbacks in Norway. Frequent
topics of concern included Chamberlain's passive and timid methods of running the war, as well
as the increasing opposition to Chamberlain in world opinion.176
While Southwestern Liberal papers displayed a moderate but increasing criticism of
Chamberlain and his government, Liberal-leaning papers in the North featured more of a
divergence. Northern Liberal publications split between positive views of the Prime Minister and
more emphatic criticism of his government, perhaps due to a mix of differing political opinions
in this region. Some Northern Liberal papers praised Chamberlain's impressive leadership.177 In
contrast, other Northern Liberal papers featured more biting criticism of Chamberlain and his
management of the British war effort. Malcolm Gunn, a Liberal editor of the Manchester
Evening News, asserted in an editorial that Chamberlain had been far too complacent in the war,
and that he employed too many Conservative “yes-men” who failed to challenge his ideas due to
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their “sheep-like allegiance” to Chamberlain.178 These regional divergences in Liberal papers on
Chamberlain's declining political situation showed that regional as well as political influences
still affected the media discourse during this period.
As the British situation in the war worsened, censorship and propaganda increased as the
government became more concerned about Home Front morale. These methods of affecting the
British media began rising with the British military failures in Norway, but the Dunkirk
Evacuation marked the real turning point when the government began utilizing censorship and
propaganda more frequently. During newspaper coverage of Chamberlain's political fall from
grace and the Norway campaign, some publications criticized the government and the war effort,
but these views stopped short of outright defeatist sentiments. Consequently, the government had
not extensively suppressed most newspapers during this period, even the left-wing and Liberal
papers which denounced Chamberlain's government and leadership. As the war situation
continued to deteriorate for Britain with the Dunkirk Evacuation and the Fall of France, the
Ministry of Information shifted its resources “increasingly towards home publicity,” attempting
to influence morale on the Home Front and avoid a public loss of confidence in the war effort.179
While the British media discourse had been united up until this point, newspaper
coverage of Chamberlain's political loss of power diverged along political lines. Left-wing
papers viewed Chamberlain with strong negativity, noting his poor planning and leadership,
while Conservative papers took the opposite view, defending Chamberlain as a strong
Conservative politician and warning against any change in government. This political divide left
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the Liberal-leaning papers mostly in the middle, containing some disapproval of Chamberlain
which increased as the Prime Minister's public support dwindled, with some regional differences.
Despite this political split, the British press remained unified. British papers of all
political leanings recognized the issues facing Britain, including the disastrous military campaign
in Norway, the unrest in government and growing public discontent with these issues. The press
mostly agreed on the problems, but they disagreed on the best solutions for them. Many papers
generally counseled patience from the Home Front regarding both the war effort and the
government.180 By encouraging patience, British papers elicited support from the Home Front,
calling for the British public to unite in support of the war effort and complying with the
Ministry of Information’s goals for increasing Home Front morale.181
Once it became clear that Chamberlain could not build any kind of coalition to retain
power, he resigned on May 10, 1940 in the face of overwhelming political pressure. At that
point, the Conservative majority faced the question of who should succeed Chamberlain as the
new Prime Minister, with the two main choices being Lord Halifax and Winston Churchill.
Critics of Halifax noted his peerage and lack of interest in the position, while Churchill retained
broad support across the public and political spectrum.182 British newspapers from all political
leanings expressed support and optimism regarding Churchill. Left-wing and Liberal papers
viewed Churchill as a preferable alternative to Chamberlain, without the leadership failures and
baggage from appeasement and the failed Norway campaign. For Conservative papers, Churchill
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at least allowed Conservatives to remain in power, and offered a chance to build further political
support as well as unite the nation behind the war effort.183

The Dunkirk Evacuation
Soon after Chamberlain's political fall from grace, the Allied war situation worsened
again with the German invasion of France and the Low Countries on May 10, 1940. The British
Expeditionary Force's retreat and subsequent evacuation from the Continent via the port of
Dunkirk, from May 26 to June 4, 1940, captured the imagination of the British Home Front. This
led to extensive coverage in newspaper articles, as the British public initially feared the worst
with the operation, but eventually experienced relief and optimism at the evacuation’s
conclusion.184 Historians of the British Home Front have placed a varying degree of emphasis on
Dunkirk's effects on British society. Angus Calder asserted that some British people felt
overjoyed at the miraculous rescue of British forces, while also challenging the mythological
narratives which the government and media propagated following the Dunkirk Evacuation.185
Walter Lord argued that Dunkirk energized the Home Front, giving the people hope and inspiring
them to contribute to the war effort.186
Coverage of Dunkirk provided a striking contrast to the reports on Chamberlain's political
failures and the Norway campaign. While articles on Chamberlain and Norway diverged along
political lines, most of these political differences dissipated during the reporting on Dunkirk. In
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particular, as the Dunkirk Evacuation progressed, the press featured less criticism of the
government and war effort. Conservative papers continued to utilize many of the same strategies
and viewpoints, having not been particularly critical of the government or war effort prior to
Dunkirk, while left-wing and Liberal papers minimized their previously critical views.
The British media discourse displayed unity regarding the Dunkirk Evacuation, even
more so than earlier in the war, due in large part to the increasing censorship and propaganda
from the Ministry of Information. According to propaganda historian David Welch, the Ministry
became increasingly concerned with Home Front morale as the British military situation
continued to worsen from May-June 1940.187 The Ministry began to intensify its propaganda
efforts during this period, encouraging the idea of a “People's War” and emphasizing that the
Home Front should not become complacent or lose confidence in the war effort.188 As the
Dunkirk Evacuation continued to progress, the government encouraged heroic narratives of the
operation in the media, culminating in a significant shift in the overall presentation of the war in
the post-Dunkirk media discourse.189
Along with this propaganda, the Ministry of Information also began tightening its control
over the press through several methods of censorship around the time of the Dunkirk Evacuation.
The Ministry began suppressing political opinions such as Communist and Fascist views in
newspapers, banning the export of the Daily Worker in May 1940 and eventually closing down
the paper altogether. The Ministry’s advisory notices to infringing newspapers articles were also
replaced with more legally forceful Censorship Board orders, against the objections of many
British journalists. Minister of Information Duff Cooper, Churchill’s appointed successor to Sir
John Reith, oversaw all these changes and transitioned the Ministry into a greater focus on
187
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strengthening the morale of the Home Front. Cooper increased the use of propaganda and
employed various data collection methods in order to gain insight into the British people’s
feelings about the Dunkirk Evacuation and the war effort. These intensifying propaganda and
censorship efforts on the Home Front greatly contributed toward the resulting unity of the press
regarding the Dunkirk Evacuation and subsequent wartime events, as newspapers began to get in
line with the Ministry of Information’s goals.190
This first phase of the Allied setbacks and the Dunkirk Evacuation, from May 20-29,
featured grim newspaper articles which largely gave an unflattering view of the deteriorating
British military situation on the Continent. As this phase continued, government censorship and
propaganda ramped up, and the overall outlook of the government regarding the evacuation
improved. By the end of this phase, the government's narrative of a victorious British nation and
the heroic Dunkirk Evacuation prevailed in many newspapers, as the previously despondent
articles transitioned into more upbeat and glorifying reports on the evacuation.
The “Phony War” period of inactivity ended on May 10, 1940 with the German invasion
of France and the Low Countries. By May 14, the Germans broke through Allied lines at the
Ardennes, with many tanks and mechanized units sweeping behind British and French supply
lines. German forces encircled the main Allied force and pushed it back towards the coastal port
of Dunkirk. The Dunkirk Evacuation then proceeded from May 26 – June 4, as the British
government scrambled to rescue as many British troops as possible. May 30 marked a turning
point as additional small vessels and volunteers began to help with the evacuation, and the
government became more optimistic about the operation. British propaganda and interference
with the press increased, as the government attempted to assuage the Home Front's anxieties
about British setbacks in the war and portray the Dunkirk Evacuation as a moral victory, rather
190

Irving and Townend, “Censorship and National Security”; Welch, Persuading the People, 14-17, 81-83, 90-91.

50

than a crushing loss against the German forces.191
By May 24, the Allied pocket had been reduced to a thin strip of land from Lille to
Dunkirk on the coast, as the press presented the daunting situation to readers. Some newspapers
asserted that the Allied situation in Belgium and France was grave, noting that the Allies were
running out of room to retreat as their forces approached the coast. Journalists emphasized the
Allies' precarious position and acknowledged that “deep anxiety must be felt in this country
whose sons are probably bearing the brunt of the ordeal.”192 The following day on May 25, the
German forces pushed the Allies further back toward Dunkirk, and British papers continued to
focus on the “grave peril” of the British military situation, as this momentous struggle for the
Allied forces' survival continued.193 In his weekly column for the Illustrated London News,
Conservative historian Arthur Bryant acknowledged that “the sky is threatening to fall” as the
British military faced its most crucial battle in centuries, noting the grim circumstances but
attempting to inspire some hope in readers with historical comparisons.194
These descriptions of the harsh reality facing the British forces continued in newspapers
for the next several days, as the Allied forces fell back to Dunkirk, and Britain launched a
massive evacuation effort on May 26 to rescue the B.E.F. from annihilation.195 British forces
suffered 66,000 casualties during the retreat to Dunkirk and the evacuation, and while the press
did not specifically focus on the rising death toll, newspapers did not hesitate to proclaim the
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potentially devastating situation facing the B.E.F.196 Coverage from May 27 noted the massive
German offensive bearing down on the Allied troops, asserting that British and French forces
were “heroically facing the mad onslaught” of continual German attacks on their position.197
Articles emphasized the significance of this moment in British military history, focusing readers'
attention on the “critical stage” which the Allies were now facing in the struggle against
Germany.198 The press did not directly criticize the British war effort, but the coverage presented
an alarming outlook to readers. The Ministry of Information continued to utilize a soft censorship
policy, passively controlling the flow of information without extensively utilizing direct
censorship. This would change in the coming days, as the appalling outlook of the war began to
threaten the stability of the Home Front, and the government became more concerned about the
British public losing confidence in the war.199
As the Dunkirk Evacuation proceeded on May 28-29, newspapers focused on the grave
situation facing the Allies, the urgency and desperation of the British troops, and the atrocities
which Germans were committing in their offensive. The Daily Herald political correspondent
W.N. Ewer noted that the British situation was “Graver” than ever on May 28, and that the Allied
forces faced a situation “of the utmost gravity.”200 Many articles noted Prime Minister Churchill's
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speech to the House of Commons, in which he described the “'extremely grave' position of the
British and French armies,” while noting that British troops were still “in good heart and fighting
with the utmost discipline.” Churchill further noted that the House should “prepare itself for hard
and heavy tidings,” emphasizing the difficult task ahead.201
Some articles focused particularly on German forces' perpetration of atrocities on
civilians, noting several incidents including German tanks machine-gunning escaping civilians
and German planes bombing hospitals. Papers used these atrocities as evidence of the heartless
and bloodthirsty nature of the German invaders, increasing anti-German fervor on the Home
Front.202 The Ministry of Information explicitly encouraged these anti-German themes among
the press, as one of the Ministry's goals included an emphasis on “the brutality of the Nazi
regime” in order to encourage the Home Front to further support the war against Germany.203
Coverage during May 28-29 noted the “grim retreat” of the Allied forces toward the coast, and
the British troops “hold[ing] grimly to their” defensive positions, despite facing “every military
disadvantage” in this struggle.204 These articles represented the height of negativity and
pessimism in the British media discourse during the first year of the war.
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After May 30, 1940, British propaganda and censorship increased during the second
phase of the Dunkirk Evacuation, with state-encouraged narratives of the heroic operation
featuring more prominently in British newspapers. Additional civilian vessels and volunteers
began aiding the evacuation, contributing to a more extensive evacuation effort and a greater
optimism among both the government and press.205 This coincided with growing government
interference with the press, as the Ministry of Information began to fear that the British public
lost confidence in the war effort. The Ministry needed to both explain this huge setback in the
war effort and attempt to use it to energize the British people.206 State narratives of the war
shifted towards encouragement of public participation in this “People's War,” inspiring
confidence on the Home Front, and coverage after May 30 reflected this new focus.207
British papers from May 30 continued to recognize the desperate odds which the Allied
soldiers were facing. Articles noted the struggle which British soldiers would have to endure in
order to defend Allied positions and complete the rescue operation.208 Newspapers tempered this
with additional heroic and patriotic imagery, however, as media coverage transitioned into a
more positive discourse supporting the government's goals of a unified Home Front supporting
the war effort.209 Some articles mentioned the Allied losses in the operation, but minimized the
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importance of these losses rather than focusing on them, reflecting the increased patriotism and
support of the war in coverage during this period.210
As more Allied troops continued to be ferried from Dunkirk to Britain, papers shifted
toward more inspiring coverage of the event, focusing on the unprecedented success of the
evacuation and the gallantry of the Allied troops in contributing to the operation. Articles from
May 31 proclaimed the evacuation a “stupendous feat,” carried out efficiently by the British
military.211 June 1 articles echoed these positive sentiments, asserting that operation was
continued “swiftly, unceasingly,” and professionally by all personnel involved.212 Coverage from
May 31-June 1 also emphasized British gallantry and courage in the war effort, rather than
focusing on the overwhelming odds and struggles which the nation faced in previous days.213
Conservative papers particularly focused on this British stoicism as a national attribute. In Arthur
Bryant's Illustrated London News column, he described English people as cool, collected and
stoic, capable of carrying on with their lives despite the recent difficulties, while the weekly
newsletter in The Sphere noted that the British people would face the present danger with their
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usual determination.214 This emphasis on gallantry directly contributed to the Ministry of
Information's Home Front goals, as the government sought to propagate the idea of a “People's
War” supported by the masses. As the government increased its propaganda efforts and
encouraged more state narratives in the press, the Ministry attempted to reinforce this idea of
“the unbreakable spirit of the British people.”215
By June 3, British ships had almost completed the evacuation, with just a small portion of
Allied troops remaining to be transferred to Britain.216 Newspaper articles continued with a
positive tone, emphasizing the discipline and increased speed of the evacuation.217 Many
newspapers also proclaimed that most of the British troops were on their way home, reassuring
British readers that this terrible chapter in the war effort drew to a close.218 As the Dunkirk
evacuation ended on June 4, papers published several retrospective articles about the entire
operation, furthering the government's narrative of a successful evacuation.219 Some of these
articles focused on the sheer magnitude and unprecedented scale of the evacuation, while others
asserted that the Allies should feel “pride and gratification at the brilliant success” of the
operation.220
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The returning home of British troops from the Continent marked the third phase of the
Dunkirk Evacuation. From May 26 to June 4, Allied soldiers continued to arrive at English
beaches and ports, mostly along the southern coast. British historians have noted the importance
of these arriving troops for the nation’s morale. Angus Calder asserted that in these ports, “large
sections of the population were swept up into the feverish activity which surrounded the troops'
return,” with volunteers providing food, supplies, and medical treatment for the new arrivals.221
Dunkirk historian Walter Lord emphasized that the local population treated the returning veterans
“like conquering heroes,” celebrating their return.222
The British government recognized that these returning soldiers could provide a powerful
morale boost for the Home Front, utilizing them as evidence of Britain's success in the Dunkirk
Evacuation. As operation progressed, the Ministry of Information increased propaganda and
censorship in an attempt to encourage continued Home Front support for the war effort and to
explain recent setbacks in the war.223 In perpetuating the heroic state narrative of Dunkirk, the
Ministry encouraged inspiring portrayals of the evacuation and the returning troops, which
offered a convenient distraction from the British defeats against Germany and the casualties
which the British military suffered thus far. British newspapers followed this patriotic narrative,
focusing articles in a unified manner on the returning soldiers, and avoiding the topic of the
66,000 casualties which Britain suffered during the fighting in France and Belgium – those
soldiers who never made it back home.224 In reporting on these returning soldiers, British papers
again featured a regional divergence, as newspapers from the Southwestern and Northern regions
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emphasized the returning troops more than publications from London. Geographical differences
likely caused this variation, as the Southwest and North contained more port cities, where local
readers may be more interested in such news. Southwestern ports were also particularly close to
the receiving areas for returning soldiers from Dunkirk.
Some London papers noted the growing anticipation for B.E.F. troops to come home, as
the evacuation fleet grew and “the spirits of the crowds that lined the beaches and cliff-tops” rose
along with it.225 Articles such as these emphasized that morale on the Home Front increased as
the evacuation progressed and more soldiers headed home to the ports. Other London papers
noted the “battle-worn” and weary appearance of many British troops who arrived in British
ports, asserting that their difficult experiences had not diminished their morale.226 Ewart
Brookes, a Daily Mirror staff reporter, wrote one of the most rousing articles about these
returning troops. Brookes observed the operation firsthand with an evacuation vessel, describing
the “grim, silent men” who embarked on their ferries and returned home to the beaches safely,
and noting that all of these soldiers “gave one backward glance to the beach... 'We'll be back,
Jerry,' they seemed to say.”227 Articles such as these perpetuated the Ministry of Information's
goals in inspiring the Home Front, portraying British soldiers as stoic and courageous men who
could not wait to return to battle. This willingness to return to the fight also encouraged British
citizens to support the war effort in any way they could, as well as giving them hope that the war
against Germany could be won despite the recent setbacks.228
Southwestern coverage also advanced many of the government's propaganda goals with
articles on the returning soldiers. Some of these papers echoed Brookes' article, portraying the

“Barges and Troops Bring More B.E.F. Men Home,” Daily Herald, June 1, 1940.
“Navy Fight for B.E.F. - Thousands Home,” Daily Mirror, May 31, 1940.
227
Ewart Brookes, “How Little Ships Rescued the B.E.F.” Daily Mirror, June 3, 1940.
228
Welch, Persuading the People, 17, 48, 81, 83, 90-91.
225
226

58

returning troops as full of high morale and eager to return to the fight quickly. One article noted
that many of the evacuated soldiers actually wanted to head back to the battle zone as quickly as
possible, in order to “have another go at the Germans.”229 Other Southwestern articles focused
more on the returning soldiers' gratefulness for their warm welcome at the ports, as well as for
the navy crews which brought them across the Channel.230 These articles emphasized positive
portrayals of the evacuated soldiers, highlighting attributes such as gratitude and a willingness to
fight while avoiding difficult topics such as the harrowing experience which the soldiers endured
in their retreat, and the large numbers of casualties.
The primary disembarking spots for the returning Dunkirk soldiers did not extend as far as
the North, but as Liverpool included one of the largest ports in Britain, papers in the region
displayed growing interest in the new arrivals at southern ports. Northern articles emphasized the
large numbers of returning troops, and the cheerful welcome which they received from the
burgeoning crowds waiting at English ports.231 Some articles compared the conflict to World War
I, noting that returning soldiers would be able to compare war stories with their veteran fathers
who had fought in Europe during 1914-1918.232 These articles did not focus on the casualties and
dire circumstances faced by Britain in both World War I and World War II, instead using the
comparison merely to inspire patriotic fervor among the British Home Front and prevent the
general public from losing confidence in the struggle against Germany.233
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Overall, the British government encouraged the media to portray the return of the B.E.F. to
English ports in a positive and inspiring manner, in order to encourage public support and
participation in the war effort. Newspapers went along with the Ministry of Information's goals
in order to appear patriotic and supportive of the war, avoiding future censorship and defeatist
accusations. Articles utilized heroic and rousing themes to achieve these goals, describing the
returning British soldiers as courageous, willing to continue fighting, and grateful for the
domestic support. Most significantly, papers did not emphasize the large number of casualties
which British forces faced, focusing instead on the evacuated soldiers who made it home.
Newspapers featured some regional differences, with Southwestern and Northern papers
focusing more on the returning troops, likely due to geographical differences. At the conclusion
of the Dunkirk Evacuation, the Ministry of Information completed its shift to a new focus on
propaganda, censorship, and the idea of a “People's War.”234

In the Spring of 1940, the British war effort encountered setbacks, as German forces
conquered Norway and swept through the Low Countries and France. On the Home Front,
political turmoil swept the nation as Prime Minister Chamberlain lost political support and
resigned under intense domestic pressure.235 Afterward, the B.E.F. escaped annihilation at
Dunkirk in the massive, unprecedented evacuation effort launched by the British government.236
During these events, the Ministry of Information moved from its early system of
voluntary censorship toward a more encompassing system of extensive propaganda and stronger
censorship. While earlier in the war, the Ministry managed the flow of information to
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newspapers but did little to directly suppress publications, it transitioned toward a pervasive
propaganda campaign aimed at the general public, as well as warning newspapers which did not
comply with the Ministry's goals. Under the leadership of Churchill’s appointed Minister of
Information Duff Cooper, the Ministry replaced its previous advisory notices with more legally
forceful orders from a Censorship Board, a change which caused widespread criticism among
British journalists. Cooper’s Ministry also began to censor political opinions as well as
strategically sensitive information, suppressing Communist and Fascist publications. The
Ministry of Information primarily focused on preventing the British people from losing
confidence in the war effort, attempting to encourage Britons to support the war with a heroic
presentation of the Dunkirk Evacuation and minimal emphasis on the casualties which British
forces suffered in the operation.237
Early in this period, old political and regional divergences resurfaced in the previously
unified British press, as papers portrayed Chamberlain's fall from grace in different ways
according to their political leanings, and some regions focused more on events such as the
Dunkirk troops' return home. Despite these differences, the British media after the Dunkirk
Evacuation displayed more unity than earlier in the war, advancing similar goals in articles on
the war effort. The “Dunkirk spirit” which the media presented during Summer 1940 carried over
into subsequent newspaper coverage of the war, as papers continued to focus on British heroism,
attempting to instill readers with a belief that Britain would prevail in the war.238

237

Welch, Persuading the People, 12-17, 48, 81-83, 90-91, 123-124; Rose, Which People's War?, 14, 29; Taylor,
British Propaganda in the Twentieth Century, 160-164; Irving and Townend, “Censorship and National
Security.”
238
Welch, Persuading the People, 123-124.

61

CHAPTER THREE: STATE NARRATIVES AND PROPAGANDA OF THE
BLITZ (SEPTEMBER 1940 – MAY 1941)

After Dunkirk, Germany attempted to force Britain into submission through heavy
bombing raids. The Luftwaffe initially focused this bombing on military targets, particularly
British aircraft installations, in the Battle of Britain from July 10 to October 31, 1940. In
September 1940, the Germans shifted this bombing strategy toward the civilian population, in an
effort to destroy the British people's will to fight. This turbulent period of the war, known as “the
Blitz,” lasted from September 7, 1940 to May 11, 1941.239
During the Blitz, German bombers continuously raided British cities and towns for over
eight months. London suffered these raids most often, but many other cities also experienced
major bombing.240 These bombing raids “marked a transition to a war at a more intense level,
and one that would be deeply experienced by the home front.”241 Scholars have divided the Blitz
into three phases. The first phase (Sept. 7, 1940 – Nov. 13, 1940) notably featured the heavy
bombing of London, with minimal targeting of regional cities. In the second phase (Nov. 14,
1940 – Jan. 19, 1941), the Luftwaffe shifted its strategy and began to target mostly regional cities
around Britain, only raiding London a few times. This continued in the third phase (Jan. 20, 1941
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– May 11, 1941), with regional cities bombed frequently and London suffering a small, but
devastating, number of raids.242
Historians have viewed the Blitz in several different ways. Some scholars, particularly
during the first wave of Home Front scholarship from the post-war years until the mid-1970s,
asserted that the Blitz was a trying time for the British nation which helped to unify its people,
increasing popular support and contribution to the war effort.243 In contrast, more recent
historians have argued that this unifying “myth of the Blitz” was a propagandistic construction,
masking underlying problems on the Home Front during that period.244
After Dunkirk, the Ministry of Information attempted to utilize the Dunkirk Evacuation
as a rallying cry for the nation, using propaganda and censorship to both explain this massive
setback in the war effort and inspire the British people. Duff Cooper continued in his role as the
Minister of Information until July 1941, after the end of the Blitz. Under Cooper’s leadership, the
Ministry continued to control the flow of information to newspapers, warning papers that printed
articles critical of the government or war effort and occasionally suppressing newspapers
outright. The Ministry sent legal orders to newspapers which printed articles containing material
in violation of the censorship policy. At the same time, the Ministry of Information employed a
more targeted propaganda campaign in the Home Front designed to energize the British
population and persuade everyone to contribute to the war. While these state narratives initially
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emphasized Dunkirk, this propaganda transitioned into an emphasis on the Battle of Britain and
then the Blitz, encouraging British stoicism and perseverance in these difficult experiences.
Newspapers utilized these state narratives, continuing to “stress cheerful courage and the
determined endurance of civilians under fire” during the Blitz.245
This chapter will analyze British newspapers from London, the Southwest, and the North,
through the lens of several major themes that persisted during the Blitz. First, British papers
often portrayed the destruction which German bombings caused during the Blitz. Articles
emphasized the destruction of property, the infliction of casualties, and other damage caused by
the raids. Some newspapers focused more on local bombings, minimizing or ignoring German
bombings elsewhere in the country. Second, coverage focused particularly on how the British
people responded to these bombings. These articles featured stories of personal bravery, the
contributions of emergency personnel, and general British stoicism in order to reassure readers
and encourage them to contribute to the war. Third, the presentation of class difference and social
struggles varied both regionally and politically, as left-wing, Liberal, and Conservative papers
each utilized the topic of class in different ways.

The Destruction of Bombing Raids
British newspaper reports often depicted the destruction caused by German bombing
raids, highlighting aspects such as the damage to property and buildings as well as the numerous
civilian deaths and injuries.246 While this emphasis on the destruction of bombing raids risked
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causing Home Front morale to drop even further, it also advanced several of the Ministry of
Information's Home Front goals. Articles on the destruction aimed to instill anti-German
sentiment among the British populace, emphasizing Nazi Germany's penchant for brutality and
increasing fear of what Britain would be like if Germany won the war. These articles also
encouraged public participation in the war, as British citizens read about the extensive damage to
their cities and the needed repairs. The Ministry focused much of its propaganda and state
narratives on these two goals during the Blitz, and newspapers aided these objectives through
articles on the bombings, both due to a voluntary desire to cooperate and appear patriotic as well
as the threat of censorship and suppression for noncompliance.247
In these newspaper reports on the bombings, the amount of coverage given to each
bombing raid varied in terms of emphasis, presentation, and prominence within that particular
issue. Newspapers often covered bombing raids in their immediate vicinity much more heavily,
often ignoring or minimizing details of raids further away.248 Papers likely utilized this strategy
due to readers' interest in local events, as well as not wanting to overwhelm British readers with
too much bombing news during the Blitz, which could lead to greater morale problems.249 Local
bombings required coverage and likely could not be ignored, but bombing raids in other areas of
the country could be largely minimized when possible. These regional divergences also led to
some resentment between different areas of Britain. Scholars have noted that regional cities often
resented the increased media attention given to London bombings, in comparison to the
miniscule amount of coverage which smaller bombings received. Residents of many British
cities felt that they suffered the worst bombings of the Blitz, regardless of statistics, and coverage
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of German raids often reflected these diverging viewpoints.250
At the beginning of the Blitz, London experienced a major German raid on September 7,
1940, known thereafter as “Black Saturday.” The Luftwaffe rained bombs on the capital city for
over 12 hours, followed by a brief lull and several more hours of heavy bombing. Beginning with
this Black Saturday raid, German bombers targeted London for 76 out of the next 77 nights, as
residents of the capital city suffered from this seemingly endless succession of bombing raids.
Initial estimates of the casualties from the Black Saturday raid indicated at least 400 deaths and
over 1,300 injured, and papers highlighted these heavy casualties.251 London coverage
emphasized the raid's unprecedented scale, the “deliberate and wanton” targeting of British
civilians, the heavy numbers of British casualties, and the extensive damage to the capital city's
historical buildings.252 This focus on Germany's victimization of the British civilian population
became a prominent theme in state narratives of the Blitz, both in newspapers and government
propaganda, encouraging anti-German sentiment.253
Southwestern and Northern papers also reported on the Black Saturday raid, but not as
extensively as the London papers. In the Southwest, Bristol papers noted the horrific aspects of
the raid, while Gloucester papers largely ignored the topic, with articles instead focusing on the
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need for more wardens and anti-air defenses, in preparation for possible future German raids.254
Gloucester's media generally concentrated more on local issues rather than bombing raids,
perhaps due to the city's regional location on the nation's periphery.255 Gloucester did not
experience any significant bombing raids during the Blitz, giving its media a fairly unique
perspective on such German bombing raids compared to the other cities in my research. Northern
papers also emphasized the destruction caused in the Black Saturday raid and encouraged antiGerman xenophobia, condemning the “terrorism bombing of the Capital.”256 Liverpool papers in
particular emphasized the raid's heavy casualties and extensive damage to the London docks,
possibly due to readers' anxiety about the Liverpool docks as a potential target for future raids. 257
This first German raid and the ensuing newspaper coverage provided a blueprint for how
the government and media continued to utilize state narratives to encourage Home Front morale
during the Blitz. British historian Peter Stansky asserted that after the first raid of the Blitz, the
Home Front experienced a certain “acceptance of the situation as well as a determined
mobilization in response.”258 As the Blitz continued and German bombing raids occurred more
frequently, the Home Front became more accustomed to the experience and the British media
discourse continued to feature an emphasis on the bombing raids' destruction, encouraging antiGerman sentiment and greater public participation in the war effort.
After September 7, 1940, German bombers continued to target London with continuous
bombing raids for the next several months, largely ignoring regional cities for the first phase of
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the Blitz. London experienced a particularly heavy bombing raid on October 14-15, 1940,
prompting newspaper coverage which utilized similar narratives to the Black Saturday
coverage.259 London papers again emphasized the raid's destruction both in terms of material
damage and civilian casualties, describing it as the city's “worst terror raid of the war” and noting
the extensive damage to London particularly St. Paul's Cathedral.260 This emphasis on the
damage to historical monuments such as St. Paul's further encouraged the state narrative of the
German bombing raids' destruction, inspiring anti-German sentiment among the British
populace. In the Southwest, Bristol papers depicted the October 7 raid as a “thunderous barrage”
on an unprecedented scale, while Gloucester papers again focused on local issues rather than the
raid.261 Northern papers also mentioned London’s damage from the October raid, but did not
focus extensively on this bombing.262 Regional papers during the Blitz often minimized or
ignored bombing raids which took place in other areas of the nation, focusing primarily on
bombing raids in their local area which held more personal significance to readers.
In the second phase of the Blitz, the German strategy changed as the Luftwaffe mostly
targeted bombing raids on regional cities, including ports, industrial centers, and population
centers. Scholars have asserted that this shift began with the heavy German raid on Coventry on
November 14-15, 1940, which began a series of comparable regional raids on other British cities,
termed the “Coventration” of these cities. Although the strategy changed, one of Germany's main
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goals in the Blitz remained the destruction of British Home Front morale, in order to encourage
Britain to sue for peace. Targeting additional cities beyond London expanded the scope of
German bombing raids and further threatened Home Front morale.263 Germans still bombed
London during the second phase, but the capital city only suffered a few major raids.264 Papers
emphasized the destruction caused by German bombing in coverage of several bombing raids
during the second phase, particularly the heavy bombing of Bristol on November 24, 1940 and
the Manchester Blitz from December 22-24, 1940.265
Bristol experienced its “Coventration” in late November 1940, as a far more intense and
targeted Luftwaffe raid than usual rocked the city. Residents of the city later recalled “[f]ire and
bombs everywhere” during a hellish experience which was unprecedented for Bristol at that
point.266 Newspapers in the Southwest reported extensively on the heavy damage and destruction
caused by the Bristol raid, as the raid's geographical proximity gave the incident a greater, more
personal impact for Southwestern citizens. Bristol papers called it the city's “heaviest air raid of
the war,” emphasizing the unexpected nature of the attack and the government's fears of heavy
civilian casualties.267 Papers in London and the North did not focus heavily on the damage
caused in the Bristol raid, either ignoring the raid entirely or minimizing its impact.268 The recent
raid on Coventry received more attention in these regions, with some articles emphasizing the
263
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grieving townspeople of Coventry while others debated the morality of the heavy bombing of
population centers in modern wars.269
These reports complied with the Ministry of Information's Home Front goals, portraying
the Germans as brutal aggressors with no qualms about committing atrocities or destroying
cities.270 Newspapers further developed this theme of destruction in articles on the December 2224, 1940 raid on Manchester. The Northern industrial city experienced its worst raid of the Blitz,
suffering thousands of casualties during several days of intense bombing over the holiday
season.271 Coverage of the Manchester raid's damage and casualties most prominently appeared
in local Northern newspapers. Articles from Manchester and Liverpool focused on the raid’s loss
of life and damage to the city. Some reports discussed the unexpected intensity and brutality of
the raid, which shocked residents of the city.272
After four months of German bombings, the British government became particularly
concerned about Home Front morale by this point in the Blitz. Under Minister Cooper’s
leadership, the Ministry of Information continued to utilize propaganda and censorship to inspire
anti-German sentiment and increase support for the war effort among the British populace,
encouraging the press to follow these state narratives. By the end of 1940, the Ministry began
emphasizing German brutality even more extensively in these state narratives, with less concern
for truthfulness and more focus on simply inspiring hatred of Nazi Germany and the German
people. This “Anger Campaign” against Germany also influenced newspapers, which continued
to endorse anti-German rhetoric with a focus on the brutal destruction left behind by German
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raids during the Blitz.273
In the third phase of the Blitz, from mid-January to May 11, 1941, the Luftwaffe
continued its strategy of mostly bombing regional cities around Britain, along with several
lengthy and destructive raids on London.274 As the Blitz approached its endpoint, two
particularly devastating raids occurred during the first two weeks of May 1941, in Liverpool and
London. From May 1-7, Liverpool and the Merseyside area endured heavy bombing for a week
straight, with large numbers of casualties and building damage.275 Unlike many previous raids,
the May Blitz on Liverpool received significant newspaper coverage from all regions, due in part
to its unexpected brutality and length, as well as the British government's increased anti-German
state narratives and propaganda from the Anger Campaign.276
London papers grimly noted the heavily damaged buildings and high casualties of the
Liverpool raid on May 1-7, emphasizing the week-long bombing's destruction and loss of life.277
Southwestern papers focused more on the German bombers' use of the particularly destructive
high explosive and incendiary bombs in the raid, a choice by the German bombers which caused
even greater damage and casualties.278 Liverpool papers placed heavy emphasis on the
destruction caused to the city and the surrounding Merseyside area. Articles focused on the
273
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damaging of many buildings and infrastructure, and noted that the government “feared that the
death-toll will be heavy” from the week-long bombing ordeal.279 Other Liverpool reports noted
that the German bombers destroyed many shops, hospitals, hotels, schools, places of worship,
and other cultural and historical buildings in the region.280 This explicit emphasis on the
Germans' destruction of one of Britain's industrial and naval centers, as well as the brutal
suffering inflicted on its people, furthered the British government's goals of attempting to inspire
anti-German sentiment and encourage popular support of the war effort.
The Blitz concluded with one final, devastating raid on London. Scholars have called
May 10, 1940 the “last and worst night of the London blitz.”281 This intense raid on the capital
city caused over 1,400 deaths and over 1,700 serious injuries, along with the destruction or
disruption of infrastructure throughout the metropolis. Massive fires raged throughout London,
blocking out the sun on the day after the raid. Some British people feared that London would not
survive more of these intense barrages, but the May 10 raid proved to be the last major raid on
London, as the Luftwaffe shifted its focus east for the invasion of the Soviet Union in June.282
Newspaper coverage of the May 10, 1940 raid marked the culmination of the state
narratives and strategies which the media and government used throughout the Blitz to
emphasize the destruction inflicted on British citizens and cities. Newspapers throughout the
nation expressed outrage and despair over this terrible raid on the capital, with London
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publications in particular mourning the extensive casualties and damage to the city.283 London
coverage described the May 10 bombing as “the most wanton raid of the war,” noting the
extensive fires raging across London, which numbered over 2,000 at the height of the capital's
burning.284 Papers in the Southwest and North also noted this destruction, emphasizing the high
number of casualties, fire, and damage to buildings, as well as extolling London's anti-air
defenses which shot down several Nazi bombers in the raid.285
The press generally aided the Ministry of Information's state narrative of anti-German
sentiment throughout the Blitz, with reports on the extensive damage and casualties inflicted on
Britain by German raids. These articles attempted to both instill resentment among British
readers towards Germans and to inspire the Home Front to support the war effort. Newspapers
generally focused particularly on raids in their local region, while occasionally minimizing or
ignoring raids in other areas. The Ministry of Information used official propaganda to aid these
goals, promoting the Anger Campaign and other anti-German state literature. The Ministry also
encouraged newspapers to support these Home Front goals through soft censorship, controlling
the flow of information, suppressing publications critical of the war effort, and generally
inspiring papers to remain supportive of the war and the official state narratives. In utilizing
these methods, the Ministry continued to exercise much greater control over the British press
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compared to earlier in the war. Minister of Information Duff Cooper oversaw this increased
media control during the Blitz, gathering statistics and data on Home Front morale in order to
improve the Ministry’s propaganda and censorship efforts.286

The Public Response to Bombing Raids
While the destruction of cities and the civilian population remained a prominent theme in
state narratives of the Blitz, the Ministry of Information also focused on the public response to
bombing raids. Concerned about public morale during German raids, the Ministry concentrated
much of its efforts on reassuring the Home Front. The government heavily focused on themes of
resilience and perseverance, using slogans such as “We can take it!” to inspire British citizens to
endure the relentless bombing attacks.287 Encouraged by the government, the press also focused
on this state narrative of public response to bombing raids, expressing this theme in several
ways. Papers emphasized the brave response of emergency personnel after raids, reassuring
readers that these emergency workers would help them. Personal acts of bravery and heroism
also became a focus of newspapers during the Blitz, highlighting ordinary citizens' contribution
to surviving the bombing attacks. Coverage also weaved general themes of British stoicism into
articles on the bombings, using inspirational language and appealing to national pride.
At the start of the Blitz, the British government created several defense and emergency
organizations in anticipation of German bombing raids. These groups included the Committee of
Imperial Defence, the Local Defence Volunteers, the Auxiliary Ambulance Service, and the
Auxiliary Fire Service. The general public initially viewed the Ambulance and Fire Services as
“service-dodgers,” but these emergency workers eventually became admired as national heroes
286
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during the Blitz.288 State propaganda focused on the bravery and selflessness of these emergency
service personnel, extolling their virtues in films such as London Can Take It! and Fires Were
Started.289 These emergency organizations mostly recruited civilian volunteers, so this focus on
emergency workers in state propaganda and the press instilled regular British citizens with
feelings of direct participation in the war effort.290
Newspapers followed this state narrative of emergency workers' heroism and
contribution, helping to perpetuate it through numerous articles on emergency personnel
response to bombing raids during the Blitz. The Ministry of Information’s control over
information flow also worked to emphasize the presence of emergency personnel. Pictures of
British cities in the aftermath of German bombings had to pass through an approval process
before being released to the public in newspapers. Many of the photographs approved for print
contained police officers and other emergency personnel standing near the wreckage and ruined
buildings left by the bombings, as the Ministry sought to reassure the Home Front that these
emergency workers would take care of them.291 In the first phase of the Blitz, newspapers
emphasized the importance of emergency personnel in several articles on the Black Saturday raid
and the October 14-15, 1940 raid on London. These articles proclaimed that emergency workers
aided injured civilians, cleared away wreckage and began repairing damaged buildings and
infrastructure in the wake of the German raids.292
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This focus on emergency workers increased as the Blitz continued. In the second phase,
papers from London and Manchester emphasized the vital importance of emergency workers'
contribution in the wake of the December 22-24, 1940 bombing of Manchester. Several articles
focused on the Auxiliary Fire Service workers in particular, noting that the firemen “worked
heroically hour after hour” to get the numerous fires under control after the German raid.293
Other articles focused more on emergency workers who aided the homeless and injured civilians,
and the volunteers who began helping with the necessary repairs.294 These articles encouraged
the people of the Home Front to look up to emergency workers, assuaging their anxieties about
the German bombings and reassuring citizens that someone would take care of them during these
turbulent events.
As the Blitz entered its final phase and German bombings increased in severity,
newspapers and state propaganda continued to emphasize the contributions of emergency
workers. In the wake of the horrific week-long May Blitz on Liverpool and the Merseyside area
from May 1-7, 1941, several newspaper articles included heroic portrayals of firemen and other
emergency personnel, noting their vital importance in the area's recovery from the German
bombing.295 The final raid on London, on May 10, 1941, featured the courageous work of many
firemen and rescue workers, cleaning up and repairing the unprecedented amount of damage left
behind by the German bombers. This contribution led to several positive portrayals of these
workers in the press. Papers especially focused on London's firemen, as they attempted to

“Manchester Blitz: Many Buildings Fired,” Manchester Evening News, December 23, 1940; “Buildings Without
Spotters in Blitzed City,” Daily Herald, December 24, 1940.
294
“Manchester Gets Its First Big Bombing,” Daily Mirror, December 24, 1940; “Manchester's Chin is Still Up,”
Manchester Evening News, December 23, 1940; “Get on the Roof,” Manchester Evening News, December 24,
1940; “Saturday Night Raid – Heroic Work By the Defence Services,” Liverpool Daily Post, December 23,
1940.
295
“Many Die in Mersey's Big Raid,” Daily Herald, May 5, 1941; “Liverpool's Worst Blitz,” Daily Mirror, May 5,
1941; “Heavy Merseyside Raid – Gallant Defence Work,” Liverpool Evening Express, May 3, 1941; “How
Citizens Faced German Air Attack,” Liverpool Evening Express, May 5, 1941.
293

76

extinguish the multitude of fires which ravaged the city, including over 2,000 fires at the height
of the raid's impact. London reports even asserted that the struggle between the heroic
firefighters and the blaze impacted Londoners more than the struggle between the city's air
defenses and German bombers.296 These heroic descriptions of emergency workers often
recurred in British newspaper coverage during the Blitz, as papers helped to propagate the state
narrative of emergency workers' “courage and sacrifice” in aiding the British people.297
Personalized stories of bravery, courage, and survival became another important facet of
British reporting on the Blitz, including both workers and regular civilians. This aided the British
government's goals of encouraging widespread support and participation in the war effort,
turning the conflict into a “People's War.”298 For example, papers noted that during the
Manchester bombing of December 22-24, 1940, twenty people became trapped in a collapsed
shelter. Some wardens arrived to help, and they ultimately broke down a nearby wall to reach the
trapped civilians, saving them. During the same raid, an article also described a Manchester
nurse who stayed in the local hospital throughout the duration of the bombing raid, in order to
care for a six-year old deaf & dumb patient who could not be moved.299 After the May 1-7 raid
on Liverpool, several local papers also printed more personalized articles about how Liverpool
residents managed to survive the raid, including stories of people narrowly escaping bombs,
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hiding under wreckage and scrambling for crowded air raid shelters.300 Many of these
personalized stories appeared in the press during this period, describing regular citizens and
workers who managed to survive the bombs or help others during the raids. Through these
stories, papers sought to encourage readers to contribute to the war effort, attempting to inspire
them to believe that regular people could endure these turbulent situations, as well as advancing
the Ministry of Information's goals and further propagating state narratives of the Blitz.301
While these articles on emergency personnel and personalized stories aided the British
government's efforts at improving Home Front morale, the propaganda campaign from the start
of the war included a significant emphasis on British stoicism and heroism. This aspect of state
propaganda appealed to traits of the British national character, encouraging citizens of the Home
Front to believe in their own strength and perseverance.302 Newspapers emphasized this British
stoicism in many articles on German bombings, subtly hinting at it in some reports, while overtly
appealing for national strength in other articles.
The press began to utilize state propaganda slogans such as “We can take it!” and “Carry
on.”303 After the Black Saturday raid, London papers noted that East Londoners continued
“carrying on” with high spirits despite the extensive damage to the city.304 Further reports on this
raid emphasized the unbroken morale of London residents, asserting that business continued as
usual.305 These themes of British perseverance continued after the October 14-15, 1940 raid on
London, with articles asserting that British people would stoically endure any struggle against

“How Citizens Faced German Air Attack,” Liverpool Evening Express, May 5, 1941; “Crowded Shelter Drama in
Big Mersey Raid,” Liverpool Echo, May 3, 1941.
301
Welch, Persuading the People, 66-72, 81-83.
302
Welch, Persuading the People, 48, 71, 81-83.
303
Welch, Persuading the People, 71-72.
304
“London's Docks Raided Again Last Night – Fires Light Bombers to City of 400 Dead,” Daily Herald,
September 9, 1940; “All London's Fires Out But One,” Daily Mirror, September 9, 1940.
305
“Hospitals, Tenements Hit in 10-Hour Raid,” Manchester Evening News, September 9, 1940; “British Courage in
Raids,” Liverpool Evening Express, September 9, 1940.
300

78

Germany, and that Germany's efforts would not force the nation to capitulate.306
After the November 24, 1940 raid on Bristol, British papers proclaimed that Bristol
residents were coming together and carrying on despite their hardships. Articles asserted that
citizens of Bristol felt that “[i]f Coventry and London can take it, we can.”307 The December 2224, 1940 raid on Manchester provoked appeals to British stoicism from papers, with assertions
that Manchester residents continued to work with a “grim determination,” making necessary
repairs and keeping their “chin up to-day.”308 These articles on Bristol and Manchester residents
presented each city's morale as a type of competition, with each city's residents competing
against each other to see who could retain the highest morale and continue with their daily lives
despite the bombings. The British government desired precisely this response from the Home
Front, as the Ministry of Information became increasingly concerned during the Blitz about the
dangers to the public morale.309 The press continued to emphasize these ideals through the final
raid of the Blitz, the May 10, 1941 bombing of London. Articles after that final raid portrayed
Londoners as stoic, resilient, and eager to get back to work and carry on with their lives.310
These portrayals of British people did not necessarily reflect the reality of Home Front
citizens during the Blitz, but rather the main goals of the British government in the war effort –
the encouragement of morale among the general public, and a refusal to capitulate in the face of
seemingly endless bombing raids. Propaganda and state-encouraged narratives among
newspapers assisted these goals, as articles focused on emergency workers, personalized stories
of courage, and general ideals of British stoicism. These articles attempted to boost morale
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among the British people until the threat of the Blitz subsided after May 1941.311

Class Conflict During the Blitz
As the British government implemented propaganda, censorship and state narratives in
order to improve the morale of the general public, the issue of class relations presented a
particularly concerning aspect of Home Front society. While the Ministry of Information
promoted ideals of a unified Home Front which supported the war effort, class differences and
social antagonism continued to cause divisions among the general populace.312 The press
expressed these class divisions in articles throughout the Blitz, as political divergences affected
each paper's methods of discussing these class issues. Left-wing papers portrayed class
divergences more frequently, sympathizing with working-class British people and the increasing
problem of homelessness caused by German raids. Conservative papers attempted to promote
state narratives of moving beyond class divisions and unifying the Home Front, while Liberal
papers examined these issues from a more balanced perspective.
In Britain, a person's class and status significantly affected their experience of German
bombings during the Blitz. Recent historians have noted that working-class Britons suffered the
most from these German raids.313 In London, working-class areas such as the East End and the
docklands were among the hardest-hit neighborhoods during the Blitz. These areas contained
lower quality buildings, more easily destroyed and difficult to repair, while the shelters in these
neighborhoods experienced more over-crowding and contained less provisions than shelters in
Angus Calder asserted that German bombings could not have broken the British “will to fight” the war, as British
citizens adapted particularly well to the situation and retained a general feeling that they could withstand the
punishment of German raids. David Welch noted that British propaganda and press played a particularly
important role in morale on the Home Front, with the government's goals of encouraging the British people to
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more upscale London areas.314 These problems also led to increased homelessness during the
Blitz, which disproportionately affected working-class and lower class people.315 In contrast, rich
British people could more easily escape the bombings by moving to the countryside, or
distracting themselves with luxuries such as dining out at expensive restaurants.316 These class
differences all combined to create powerful social conflicts during this period, with various
portrayals of these class issues appearing in coverage of the Blitz.
Left-leaning newspapers attempted to raise awareness of class issues through articles on
German bombings and the ensuing aftermath of these raids. After the initial bombing of London,
one left-wing paper noted that most of the German bombs “fell among the congested streets of
dockland, on the homes of the poor.”317 Leftist papers praised the strong working-class spirit
among the people of the East End and docklands, emphasizing that even the destitute residents of
the area retained high morale, insisting that they would make it through the turbulent
experiences.318 Left-wing papers also noted the greater impact of the German bombings on poor
British children. These papers asserted that, in the aftermath of Bristol's heavy bombing in
November 1940, many children in the city would not be getting presents for Christmas that year,
as some shops were damaged and others had raised prices.319 Leftist coverage also continued to
focus on the issue of homelessness, detailing the problems which these Blitz bombings caused
for working-class Britons in particular, as many of them lost their homes.320
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In contrast to left-wing papers, Conservative newspapers did not regularly address class
issues in coverage of the Blitz. In some cases, Conservative publications even attempted to
minimize the importance of class problems, instead over-emphasizing the unity and togetherness
of British people in the wake of the Luftwaffe bombings. Conservative articles described the
Black Saturday bombing of London as indiscriminate, arguing that the raid affected London's
unfortunate civilians as a whole.321 Further articles called for national unity, minimizing the
damage to working-class Britons' property: “Our whole sympathy in this tragedy centres on the
human victims, the innocent victims. Property means nothing at all. Lost possessions do not
count. The nation is proud to share every loss.”322 Yet it seems convenient for a Conservative
paper targeted at wealthy readers to proclaim lost property and possessions as inconsequential.
The people suffering that damage included many working-class Londoners who could not afford
to replace their homes or possessions, or even buy Christmas presents.323
Conservative calls for unity continued as the Blitz proceeded, and these papers mostly
avoided any focus on the homeless problem when discussing further German raids.324 After the
Luftwaffe's May 10, 1941 raid on London at the conclusion of the Blitz, Conservative papers
asserted that Germany now threatened “the English-speaking world in general” with its brutality
and despotism.325 Conservative appeals to patriotic unity reached their crescendo with this
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speaking world and its historical foundations against the barbarism of the fascist Axis powers,
failing to address any class differences in this portrayal.
As with many political issues, the perspective of Liberal-leaning papers fell in between
left-wing and Conservative papers on the issue of class struggle. Liberal papers acknowledged
that the Blitz disproportionately affected the poor and working class residents of British cities,
but failed to focus on this problem or advocate any concrete solutions for it.326 Some Liberalleaning papers noted the growing problem of homelessness as the Blitz continued, but remained
optimistic about this problem rather than focusing on the plight of the homeless as in left-wing
articles.327 Generally, articles from Liberal papers indicated that those publications preferred to
remain largely neutral regarding the issue of class struggle during the war, noting some of the
problems facing poor and working-class Britons but declining to advocate solutions for them.
Class struggles posed a challenge to the British government and media's attempts at
influencing Home Front morale during the Blitz. These class problems threatened to undermine
the prevailing state narratives of the Blitz, which asserted that British society should unify
behind the war effort. This danger to Home Front unity caused the Ministry of Information great
concern regarding any “expressions of 'class feeling'” during the Blitz, leading to propaganda

The Western Daily Press noted that “most of the bombs fell among the poor – in congested working-class
districts.” “'Carry On' London After Big Raids,” Western Daily Press, September 9, 1940. The Liverpool Daily
Post also noted that the London docks were hit hardest in the September 7 bombing, which contained many
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1940. The Western Daily Press asserted that kids in badly bombed areas of Bristol were having a tough time at
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and state material which emphasized British unity over any class sentiment.328 In this instance,
the largely unified British press did not entirely advance the government's goals, as both leftwing and Liberal papers included portrayals of class struggle and sympathy for the poor and
working-class residents of British cities. These newspaper articles showed that despite the large
amount of unity in the post-Dunkirk British press, old political biases also caused divergences
among the media discourse during the Blitz. These class struggles continued after the war, as
British people expected to be rewarded for their sacrifices and contribution to the war effort,
desiring a restructured British society with more support for poor and working-class residents.
These people “wanted to believe that after the war Britain would be a better place... a country
worth fighting for,” and their expectations did not fully materialize after the war.329

During the Blitz, British newspapers generally focused on several state narratives in
reports on German bombings. Publications highlighted the destruction which German raids
caused, examining both the extensive civilian casualties as well as the damage to buildings and
infrastructure. This focus on destruction helped advance the Ministry of Information's goals for
on the Home Front, leading the British people to resent the Germans who attacked their cities
and killed their compatriots. Papers also reported on the civilian response to bombings, noting
examples of emergency personnel's contributions, personal stories of courage, and British
resilience. These articles further advanced the government's goals, by inspiring the people of the
Home Front to contribute to the war effort. Such themes aimed to keep up the Home Front
morale more generally, attempting to manage the fears of British citizens about German raids.330
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Political differences remained among the British media, as newspapers portrayed class
differences and social struggle in different ways. These class problems affected British morale on
the Home Front, threatening the government's goals of Home Front unity and support for the
war. While most British newspapers displayed a unified viewpoint and advanced many state
narratives during the Blitz, this differing portrayal of class issues encompassed one instance
where papers politically differed. Despite this variation, the British media discourse generally
continued to advance state narratives and comply with the Ministry of Information's goals. The
Ministry directed this media discourse through its increased control over the press under Minister
Cooper’s leadership.331
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CONCLUSION
The British government heavily focused on the importance of Home Front morale during
World War II, viewing the “connection between propaganda and censorship” as one of the keys
to retaining high morale among the general public.332 The Ministry of Information advanced
these goals through the propagation of state narratives, censoring or warning publications, and
encouraging the media to follow these narratives. British newspapers utilized many of the
Ministry's narratives in articles during the first two years of the war, which my research primarily
focuses on. Coverage throughout this period displayed a significant amount of unity and
willingness to advance the British government's goals, both due to increasing censorship as the
war advanced as well as a desire to appear patriotic and supportive of the war effort. Despite this
unity, old political and regional divergences reemerged, as newspapers disagreed about which
topics to most prominently focus on, and how to portray issues such as Chamberlain's political
fall from grace or the class struggles during the Blitz. Nevertheless, these differences did not
fracture the British media discourse during the war, as newspapers remained largely unified in
the presentation of wartime events, even early in the war.333
At the start of the war in September 1939, the British government established the
Ministry of Information with the goal of managing morale on the Home Front, with Minister of
Information Sir John Reith at its head. The Ministry initially encountered many problems under
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Reith’s leadership, as it employed a system of voluntary censorship and controlling the flow of
information, without a strong overall plan of managing Home Front publications or propaganda.
The Ministry’s advisory noticed to newspapers in violation of the censorship guidelines also
lacked strong legal authority during this early period. Despite this lack of early censorship,
newspapers during the first five months of the conflict mostly displayed unity in their
presentation of wartime events, with some regional variation. Patriotic sentiment and support for
the war effort featured prominently in these early articles on the declaration of war. Papers
differed according to region regarding the nation’s preparations for war, as certain areas’
publications focused more on defensive preparations, rationing, blackouts, or anti-German
sentiment. These regional divergences revealed the different concerns of each British region, as
well as Home Front anxieties about the war. Articles on the domestic evacuation of children also
featured a unified message advancing the government's goals of a positive an optimistic portrayal
of the operation, while focusing more on either the separation from parents or the assimilating
children depending on the region of the paper’s publication. These articles minimized many
problems with the operation or blamed the evacuated children for them, and generally attempted
to assuage the anxieties of British citizens regarding the population transfer.334
As the Phoney War period came to an end in May 1940, the Ministry of Information
increased its usage of propaganda and censorship in order to further improve morale on the
Home Front, largely as a response to the challenges posed by the Dunkirk Evacuation. The
Ministry encouraged state narratives of a People's War, supported by a united British Home
Front, and suppressed or warned publications which were critical of the war effort. Prime
Minister Chamberlain's leadership failures and subsequent political fall from grace received
334
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extensive coverage in British newspapers, with political divergences between left-wing, Liberal,
and Conservative papers on how to portray these failures. Despite this political divergence,
British papers remained unified and supportive of the war effort. From the Dunkirk Evacuation
onward, the Ministry of Information utilized more extensive censorship and propaganda, reacting
to the threat of Home Front collapse in the wake of massive setbacks in the British war effort.
Prime Minister Churchill appointed Duff Cooper as the new Minister of Information, and the
Ministry under his leadership began to exercise greater control over the British press. The
previous advisory notices became legally enforced orders, and the Ministry began to suppress
political opinions such as Communist or Fascist leanings in addition to strategically sensitive
information. The press followed the government's narrative of a successful Dunkirk Evacuation,
utilizing inspiring portrayals of the British troops returning home in order to encourage morale
on the Home Front and ignoring the tens of thousands of casualties which British forces suffered
in the operation. By June 1940, the British media discourse fully united to support the war effort,
as the Ministry of Information's efforts at encouraging Home Front morale improved.335
Germany began heavily bombing British cities during the Blitz, as the British government
grew more concerned about the potential for negative morale on the Home Front. Under Minister
Cooper’s direction, the Ministry of Information continued to utilize its increased control over the
press, and newspapers fell into line with the Ministry’s goals. The Ministry consistently
advanced several state narratives of the Blitz in order to combat negative morale, emphasizing
unity, xenophobia, and stoicism. Newspapers propagated these narratives in articles on Blitz
bombings, focusing on the destruction of British cities and the response of civilians to the
bombings. The focus on destruction and casualties encouraged anti-German sentiment on the
335
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Home Front, inspiring British citizens to unite in their resentment of Germany. In addition,
newspapers' focus on civilian response emphasized the role of emergency workers and regular
citizens, while generally advancing the government's narrative of uniting the Home Front. British
papers still displayed some political divergences during the Blitz, however, as left-wing, Liberal,
and Conservative papers featured different portrayals of class struggles and their importance to
the Home Front during this period.336
This unity of the media discourse directly flowed from the Ministry of Information's
propaganda and censorship efforts on the Home Front. As the war progressed, the Ministry
increasingly utilized state-sponsored propaganda, information control, warning of newspapers,
and occasionally outright suppression of publications in order to advance its goals of increasing
Home Front morale. As British historian Angus Calder asserted in The People's War, the morale
of the Home Front remained one of the key components to British success in the war.337
The historiography of the British Home Front generally progressed from first wave
histories (from 1945 to the mid-1970s) which focused mostly on the unity of the Home Front and
minimized negative aspects of wartime society, towards second wave histories (from the mid1970s to present) which viewed the wartime years more critically, emphasizing problems on the
Home Front such as civil unrest and objections to the war.338 Many of these second wave
historians have largely viewed the early months of the war critically, noting the lack of unity on
336
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the Home Front and pervasive social problems among British society and asserting that Britain
only later became unified in support of the war, after events such as the Dunkirk Evacuation.339
My research adds a new element to these second wave histories, as my examination of
British newspapers from 1939-1941 indicates that this unity existed on the British Home Front
from the beginning of the war. This unified media discourse increased as the Ministry of
Information furthered its propaganda and censorship after the Dunkirk Evacuation, but it already
existed from the declaration of war onwards. In addition, the regional and political differences
among the newspapers in my research indicate that this unity persisted in British media discourse
despite many differing viewpoints on wartime issues.
The specific focus of my research on these three British regions, including papers from
all three major political leanings in Britain, also allowed for a greater comparison between the
similarities and differences between these regional and political viewpoints. This comparison
highlights the different circumstances which newspapers, as well as British citizens, found
themselves from 1939-1941, which affected the viewpoints expressed in these publications.
Although each of these newspapers featured some regional and political variation, each paper
contributed to the Ministry of Information's goals on the Home Front. During these first two
years of the war, the British government primarily concentrated on the management of Home
Front morale, and newspapers played a critical role in achieving that goal.340
This examination also presents numerous possibilities for additional research. If I
continued researching the British media discourse during World War II, I would analyze
additional newspaper archives to obtain different political and regional viewpoints on these
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events, possibly visiting the local newspaper archives at their places of publication in England.
Letters to the editor as well as the notes, diaries and private accounts of British journalists
working at these papers would also allow for further exploration of this topic. In addition to these
supplemental sources, I would also examine the press in other regions in Britain, comparing
newspapers in these regions and analyzing their coverage of key events for similarities and
divergences. This could help expand my analysis of the British media discourse during World
War II and lead to further insights on the regional and political variation between publications in
different areas of the nation.
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